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Global Agenda Council on Institutional Governance Systems

# Effective Leadership in International Organizations

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# Executive Summary

Good leadership in international organizations is necessary, but not sufficient, for their success. Structures supporting leadership vary enormously across global agencies. This report highlights some of the best practices across 11 organizations that facilitate good leadership. It also underscores that international institutions could learn from each other's practices across seven domains: (1) selecting and re-electing leadership on merit, (2) managing performance, (3) setting and evaluating ethical standards, (4) developing and retaining talent, (5) setting strategic priorities, (6) engaging with a wide range of stakeholders, and (7) evaluating independently and effectively.

# 1. The Effective Leadership Project

## a. Global Governance in the 21st Century

Over the last two decades, the world has suffered from a global governance deficit. This deficit comprises a lack of the following:

- Adequate mechanisms to deal with issues of international peace and security
- Satisfactory mechanisms to anticipate and counter global economic shocks
- Effective instruments to ensure important global public goods, not least in critical areas such as climate change and public health

In the early 2000s, it was expected that the international community would embark on a comprehensive effort to overhaul the multilateral system, with renewed rules and institutions to address the challenges posed by evolving geopolitical and economic circumstances. These ambitions included reform of World Bank and IMF governance; creation of a new world environmental institution; and ongoing attempts at United Nations (UN) Security Council reform. Recent history suggests, however, that such a comprehensive overhaul will not take place anytime soon.

Almost every effort to significantly transform the mechanisms for international cooperation and coordination has failed. The floundering of the 2005 UN World Summit, the collapse of the World Trade Organization's (WTO) Doha Round, the disappointing progress on climate change, and the non-fulfilment of early and indispensable G20 commitments all suggest that governments are not ready, or not willing, to close the growing governance gap, at least within the next few years.

In other words, no transformative overhaul of international institutions should be expected in the foreseeable future. In no way should the pertinent players give up on existing institutions; rather, the only realistic alternative seems to be incremental reform.<sup>1</sup> Scarce political capital should be applied to improving the performance of multilateral institutions, as radical transformations of the existing overall framework cannot be counted on. Based on this notion, this project addresses one aspect where incremental reform seems not only necessary, but feasible: in the leadership of international organizations (IOs).

## b. Why Focus on Leadership?

Effective leadership in international agencies is crucial: the world relies on these organizations to ease cooperation – whether in ensuring pandemics are constrained, mail is delivered to foreign countries, or citizens can fly safely to other countries.

To be effective, agencies need leaders who can identify and deliver on organizational goals without the constraint of undue influence, by individual members or other stakeholders. Yet, some IOs have not even defined the leader's role, let alone recruited or managed that person on the basis of particular knowledge, competence and experience required to effectively lead the organization. In addition, democratic election processes and strong accountability mechanisms are necessary to ensure that the interests of executive management are aligned with the organization.

While good leadership is not enough for successful international cooperation, it is necessary for effective governance. However, leadership performance in organizations is often buried behind arguments about which country should get “the top job”. The presumption is that, once appointed, leaders have their hands tied by member states, and will predominantly serve their patrons' interests. Indeed, leaders' performance is seldom rigorously tested or measured. Moreover, little attention has been paid to the institutional features needed to promote effective and accountable governance.


This project of the Global Agenda Council on Institutional Governance Systems has taken up the challenge. First, the project has identified ways in which leadership makes a positive difference in the performance of international agencies. Second, the research team has investigated a sample of IOs, drawing out best (and other) practices that either illustrate or indicate a lack of high-performing leadership.

The report's seven sections cover the positive practices emerging in IOs that support good leadership. This introduction sets out the conception of leadership, as well as the study's rationale, method and strategy.

### c. Constrained Leadership

Leaders influence their agencies' operational and strategic direction. They work with member states to identify priorities and set strategy, and translate this into operational goals, which in turn are monitored and evaluated as progress is made towards them. Leaders direct a bureaucracy and see that it has sufficient staffing, expertise and financing to carry out mandated tasks. They also must consult and work with other stakeholders. While their room for manoeuvring is limited (see Figure), their actions and behaviour are vital to their organizations' success. Finally, organizations that depend on ad-hoc funding also constrain their leaders.

**Figure:** Types of Forces that Constrain Leadership



High performance in a leadership role has a major impact on an organization's ability to deliver on tasks requested by its member states. An IO with weak operational planning, high staff turnover and vulnerability to special interests is unlikely to perform effectively. Not only do leadership governance and effectiveness need more attention in international organizations; a striking need also exists for more practice-focused comparisons across organizations so they can learn from each other.

An important caveat should be emphasized: improving leadership in IOs is just one part of improving their overall performance. Leaders are heavily constrained, relying on financing from the member states that select them. Some IO boards "monitor" their leadership and organizations' architectures very closely, meeting weekly to discuss and provide regular input to operational business, while others may only convene several times a year. The enormous differences in the broader governance structures of IOs, which greatly influence their operations, are noted in this report.

### d. How Are "Effective Leadership Structures" Measured?

Through extensive deliberations, the Council and project team have identified seven indicators of effective leadership structures:

1. Selecting and re-electing leadership on merit
2. Managing performance
3. Setting and evaluating ethical standards
4. Developing and retaining talent
5. Setting strategic priorities
6. Engaging with a wide range of stakeholders
7. Evaluating independently and effectively

In addition, the Council and team sought to capture innovations in leadership across the organizational cases.

Not all of the important elements could be measured. In fact, it was difficult to find a metric to measure the degree to which leadership structures permit resistance against "capture" by a powerful state, private companies or vested interests; and this despite that many instances exist of undue influences undermining an organization's performance (an organization's leadership can play a key role in ensuring this does not happen, or at least that it is brought to the public's attention). Some of this dimension of leadership is covered in the report's reflections on ethical standards, setting strategic priorities (e.g. the proportion of core vs earmarked funds) and procedures for electing an administrator, director-general (DG) or managing director (MD). Future research could investigate other measures of organizational independence and impartiality, such as whether heads of organizations should chair council or governing body meetings, and how effectively they can shape decision-making in these meetings to guard against special interests. Studies could also examine if an organization's leader is able to publish reports, policy positions or advice in the organization's name, without prior approval of member states.<sup>2</sup>

Another important element of leadership is the "speed of renewal" and the capacity to adapt to changing external environments. This was very difficult to measure or compare across the 11 different organizations, given the variety of environments and issue areas. In the future, studies could look at the extent to which IO heads can (and do) initiate projects, pilots or discussions to address emerging issues, and the leeway they have to shape these. Finally, the authors believe leaders play an essential role in ensuring their organizations collaborate with others to deliver cooperation and other public goods. Future research, it is hoped, will identify ways to track governance in this area.

The report reflects on practices from a pilot group of international organizations. In some cases, good practice seems relatively straightforward. For example, for the selection of an organization's head: do clear and publicly available terms of reference (TOR) exist for both the position and a high-quality, exhaustive search process? As for ethical leadership, are leaders required to sign and adhere to the organization's ethical codes, and publicly declare any conflicts of interest and their financial assets? In some cases, good practices may vary enormously – for instance, in how leaders attract and retain a diverse staff.

This study benchmarks current practices and does not rank organizations against each other, as significant differences in the structure, size, nature and scope of IOs make ranking problematic. However, some common principles and structures could strengthen leadership possibilities in all organizations.

## e. Methods for Assessing Organizations

The Council identified seven indicators contributing to effective leadership. The research team then determined questions for assessing IOs on each of the indicators and for using as the basis for studies of leadership practices in 11 organizations (see appendix): African Development Bank (AfDB), Asian Development Bank (ADB), European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD), Inter-American Development Bank (IDB), International Monetary Fund (IMF), International Organization for Migration (IOM), United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), World Bank, World Health Organization (WHO) and World Trade Organization (WTO).

These organizations were selected because they cover a broad range of issue areas (from health to migration and development), vary in size, and include regional and international bodies. However, the selection was not intended to be representative of all intergovernmental organizations, but rather to provide a basis for the pilot study of best practice in governance. Inclusion of other organizations in future studies is encouraged.

A research team initially conducted a desk-based study, looking for publicly available evidence of each indicator. Follow-up interviews with former and current senior officials of the organization, as well as key stakeholders and academic experts, were conducted. Their inputs were used to identify additional documentation of formal processes, and to identify relevant informal practices. Although the report is focused on the presence of formal processes (documented officially, wherever possible, when sufficient evidence is available), the differences between formal and informal processes have also been captured. The evidence included in the appendix is separated into two columns: “published rules”, based on official organizational documents; and “other factors”, which draw on a range of sources – including interviews with experts on the organization and staff – to gain more subjective insights into informal practice. Where possible, “decoupling” (when formal rules are in place but are not to be implemented in practice) is noted. While attempts were made to gather the most recent information for each organization, the study may not capture all organizational practices, as many of the organizations were undergoing significant reforms. A summary of good, formal leadership practices is shown in the Table.

The data for each question across the 11 organizations was analysed to identify variations in practice. The objective was not to derive an “ideal” best practice, although management and public administration studies were also consulted. The report is limited to practices in IOs from which other organizations could learn. Readers and organizations are invited to contribute input<sup>3</sup> from practices and examples not discussed in this report.

## f. Who Is Responsible for Delivering Effective Leadership Structures?

An organization’s membership (represented on its board) and its senior management are collectively responsible for ensuring effective processes are in place. The membership or the board have responsibility for some criteria (election and re-election procedures for heads); other indicators fall under the scope of senior leadership (ethical codes, conflicts of interest), and some are shared (setting strategic priorities). In some organizations, a “grey zone” may exist, where it is not always clear who is responsible – the leader, senior management team, membership or board. By identifying these priority areas, organizations should be able to focus attention and clarify who will take the lead.

## g. The Objectives of the Study

This study aims to inspire greater attention to leadership in international organizations, instigate learning across them and draw attention to good practice. Many organizations in this study are already engaged in reforming their governance mechanisms, strategic frameworks or other organizational processes. This study highlights leadership structures as one element that should be taken into account. It is planned to share results with relevant forums, bringing together boards and committees in the UN system, and across international financial institutions and development banks. Apparently, a number of these organizations are already sharing practices. It is hoped that the study will foster a more systematic comparison and identification of good practice, thus enabling more direct learning.



**Table: Good Leadership Practices among the 11 Selected Organizations**

Indicators	Examples of Formal Practice
	<b>→Selecting and re-electing leadership on merit</b>
1. Organizations should search for candidates with specific, relevant competencies, and test these against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process.	Criteria/TOR for leadership are published online
	Selection process updates are available online
	Passport blind selection of candidates is done
	Other candidates are always considered in re-elections
	Performance is given formal consideration in re-elections
	<b>→Managing performance</b>
2. Organizations should have clear expectations of performance, which are transparent and consistent with their goals, and facilitate leadership accountability.	Leaders are expected to set performance expectations in inaugural speech
	Boards conduct regular individual performance appraisals
	<b>→Setting and evaluating ethical standards</b>
3. Leadership should comply with clearly defined ethical standards.	Leaders are obliged to disclose financial assets and conflicts of interest
	Leaders are obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics
	Compliance with the code of ethics is enforced
	<b>→Developing and retaining talent</b>
4. Leadership should attract, retain and develop talent throughout the organization.	Leaders carry out regular global staff surveys
	Leaders ensure survey results are monitored and utilized
	Leaders are obliged to participate in formal training programmes for their own professional development
	<b>→Setting strategic priorities</b>
5. Leadership should have the authority and mechanisms to shift strategic priorities due to changing circumstances.	Strategic documents include measurable objectives
	<b>→Engaging with a wide range of stakeholders</b>
6. Organizations should have structures that encourage management to engage with a wide range of stakeholders.	Meetings between stakeholder organizations and a diverse range of civil society actors occur on a regular, established basis
	<b>→Evaluating independently and effectively</b>
7. Organizations should have structures that encourage management to engage with internal and external evaluations.	Evaluation office reports directly to the board
	Management must respond to evaluations

Source: Authors

# 2. Emerging Good Practices

## a. Selecting and Re-Electing Leadership on Merit

Many international organizations have no selection process that clearly searches for and tests candidates on relevant (and much-needed) leadership competencies in their domain. Often, leaders are selected in a political bargaining process. However, some changes are under way.

The review of leadership selection revealed four important practices, each of which is being used in at least one international agency: (1) the leadership role is clearly defined, (2) the competencies and experience needed to take up the role are clearly stated, (3) the role and competencies are openly advertised, and (4) the selection process is transparent and clear.

**WHO**, for example, set out a code of conduct in 2011 to ensure ethical and transparent nomination and election of leadership. It specifically notes that every candidate is expected to provide supporting evidence to match each of the published criteria for the Director General position. The executive board shortlists those candidates matching the criteria.<sup>4</sup>

In its selection process, the **WTO** actively seeks to reflect its membership's diversity. An official WTO document (WT/L/509, published in 2002 and available online) invites nominations from across all regions and stipulates that, in the case of equally meritorious candidates for DG appointments, the diversity of WTO membership shall be taken into account.<sup>5</sup> The document also gives the clear time frame for the process to start nine months before, and be completed 3 months prior to, the end of the incumbent's term. The recent election of the WTO DG was a role model of transparency: all stages were well documented and exposed through a special page on the WTO website.

Although selecting its president remains non-exhaustive and without a clear formal process, the **EBRD** is introducing greater rigour at the vice-president (VP) level. For example, EBRD conducted an exhaustive review from over 850 applicants for the position of VP of banking operations (a post traditionally held by an American). The search was passport-blind, and included psychometric testing and multiple interviews.<sup>6</sup>

The **IMF** has been opening up its processes. In 2011, it published its first comprehensive terms of appointment for its Managing Director.<sup>7</sup> In addition to its Articles of Agreement and By-Laws, which contain a standardized job description for executive directors, the IMF published complete terms of reference in the same year for the ethics advisor,<sup>8</sup> ombudsperson<sup>9</sup> and director of the Independent Evaluation Office.<sup>10</sup> The IMF already instituted a rigorous process of candidate profiling in 2007, making available full job descriptions, and the desired qualities and experience of candidates. The executive board set out a timetable and invited nominations from executive directors for the post of MD, interviewing those that did apply.<sup>11</sup> However, the IMF's good *formal* practice is undermined by the *informal* convention that the organization's European members, in consultation with the other members, ultimately select a European as MD.

In the **WTO**, all decisions, including selection of the DG, are made by consensus of all members. If a consensus cannot be reached in the appointed time, a provision allows for a vote by the General Council.<sup>12</sup> In the 2012 DG selection process, WTO members officially nominated nine candidates, each of whom presented their vision for the WTO at a council meeting in January 2013. In the final two months of the process, the council chair consulted with members to build a consensus. The selection process concluded with a council meeting in May, where the decision to appoint the new DG was taken. Practices for re-election or reappointment are not particularly strong across organizations. Performance can be difficult to assess, as few international organizations have objectives for their leadership on this measure. WHO stands out in this regard. During the re-election of its DG in May 2012, the incumbent wrote a self-assessment that evaluated her first-term performance on the priorities she had set out; this was captured in a document and taken into account through the re-nomination process. The **AfDB** now considers a range of candidates alongside the incumbent for re-election, as does the EBRD, where Sir Suma Chakrabarti was selected over the incumbent president in 2012. The more exhaustive, inclusive and meritocratic the process, the better the chance of not only the best candidate being chosen or reappointed, but also of full membership being engaged to hold that candidate accountable for performance.

## b. Managing Performance

Governments expect that heads of international organizations, once appointed, will deliver on their mandated goals. However, individual states often have divergent views on organizational priorities and the role of leaders, and some states have greater influence over leadership selection and subsequent decision-making. It is thus critical that the membership and the leader agree together on performance expectations, particularly at the start of a new tenure. Furthermore, the leader's responsibilities with respect to vision, goals and implementation need to be carefully differentiated from those of the board. Otherwise, lines of accountability and responsibility are blurred, and the board can no longer evaluate the leader's performance without evaluating its own.<sup>13</sup> Setting performance expectations can help prevent organizational capture (when the leader becomes the instrument of a few states) and enable performance management.

Despite the proliferation of results-based management, no organization in this study had an openly published formal procedure for setting performance expectations for the leader. However, all leaders were expected to report regularly to member states on overall organizational performance at board, council and other equivalent meetings.<sup>14</sup>

In some international organizations, incoming presidents or directors are expected to deliver a statement to the board or general council, setting out a vision and objectives for the organization during their tenure. Such a procedure, for example, took place at the WTO in 2009.<sup>15</sup> In recent years, the president-elect of the AfDB also delivered a working plan at the swearing-in ceremony.<sup>16</sup>

If performance objectives are set, boards can conduct regular performance appraisals to give feedback on a leader's successes and failures. Regular management of leaders' performance is standard across the private and public sectors. A formal, annual process to evaluate chief executive officer performance exists in 80% of US non-profit boards and 96% of Standard and Poor's 500 companies.<sup>17</sup> However, very few international organizations have institutionalized annual performance appraisals of their leaders. One study found that none of the major international financial institutions conducted individual performance appraisals in 2008.<sup>18</sup>

More recently, some organizations have sought to address this deficit. Since 2009, the MD of the IMF has been evaluated annually by the board, based on agreed performance objectives. As part of the feedback, the MD also assesses the executive board's performance. The framework is tailored by job position and based on the IMF's annual performance review template. Annual salary adjustments for IMF management are linked to the consumer price index, and allow for performance-based merit increases.

In 2008, Ban Ki-moon, UN Secretary-General, established Senior Managers' Compacts for many senior UN officials. These compacts outline the roles of UN department heads, although they do not cover UNHCR or UNDP. Heads must report if they are spending their budgets according to programme objectives.<sup>19</sup> In addition, they are reviewed on how well they promote gender diversity and follow geographic distribution requirements. The UN Secretariat's Management Performance Board uses the compacts to assess senior UN leaders annually.<sup>20</sup>

## c. Setting and Evaluating Ethical Standards

In recent years, a number of heads of major international organizations have resigned because of questions about their ethical conduct.<sup>21</sup> Three sets of practices are associated with upholding ethical standards: (1) an ethics code; (2) a clear authority in charge of monitoring and enforcing it, and dealing with non-compliance; and (3) formal declarations of any conflicts of interest and financial assets of senior leaders.

Every international organization examined in this study obliges all staff and heads to adhere to a code of ethics. However, not all codes are public, and not all are formally enforced. The EBRD has a defined formal code of conduct (updated in 2012), which is overseen by a chief compliance officer who reports directly to the president. The **World Bank Group** has its Office of Ethics and Business Conduct, an ethics helpline, a code of conduct for staff (2003) and the Code of Conduct for Board Officials, which focuses on disclosure policies.<sup>22</sup> With women's accession at the Group, the documents have recently been refined to include sexual harassment. Meanwhile, the WTO's code of core values is only circulated internally. All UN staff are obliged to follow its code of conduct, and many UN agencies, such as **UNHCR**, have set their own codes of conduct.<sup>23</sup>

Some organizations require disclosures of conflicts of interest and financial assets. Declarations are filed annually at the AfDB, which also has an organization-wide whistle-blowing policy (2007), anti-corruption and fraud framework (2006) and an office to investigate disclosures. This was a product of a joint anti-corruption task force (2006) of international financial institutions.<sup>24</sup> In the UN system, all senior officers must file an annual financial disclosure statement with the UN ethics office.<sup>25</sup> Those who do not are charged and may be penalized by the UN's Department for Administration and Management.<sup>26</sup> The **UNDP** administrator and the UNHCR high commissioner have voluntarily disclosed their financial assets publicly, and made them available online.<sup>27</sup> However, these organizations are exceptions: most leaders do not publicly disclose their financial assets.

#### d. Developing and Retaining Talent

A core responsibility of leaders at IOs is to attract, develop and retain outstanding staff. Leaders can thus help to ensure their workforces have the capacity and diversity to deliver on the organization's vision and strategy, while proactively addressing gaps in capability.<sup>28</sup> This is a challenge for international organizations, where it is understood that particular countries should hold certain positions, and staff selection is seen as requiring a balance of national diversity and merit. At worst, leaders may face pressure from states to hire particular individuals for high-level posts.

IOs can attract, develop and retain talent in many ways – for example, through policies for fair and transparent staff selection, and by ensuring diversity of staff at all levels. However, when trying to study staff diversity in gender and nationality across the 11 organizations, it was difficult to get accurate, comparable data for all organizations. For this reason, the use of staff surveys, while a limited measure, was seen as evidence of senior managements' interest in staff welfare. Such surveys, as well as staff liaison organizations, are used by some organizations to monitor staff progression and ensure that it is, and is perceived to be, based on merit. UNHCR conducts staff surveys every three years, and has done so since 2006. The agency has a committee dedicated to carrying out survey recommendations and developing action plans.<sup>29</sup> The High Commissioner has tasked the Deputy High Commissioner with following up recommendations from this committee's deliberations. Responses to UNHCR's staff survey have guided human resources reform and resulted in changes to the agency's postings and promotions procedures.<sup>30</sup> UNDP's annual global staff surveys are conducted by an external independent organization. The EBRD has recently reprioritized staff surveys, conducting them annually rather than every three years.<sup>31</sup> As yet, none of the international organizations examined makes staff survey results available online.

Heads of organizations mentor, support and coach their staff. While few formal processes exist for this, evidence does show widespread informal practices in many organizations. For example, **IOM's** director-general makes it a priority to open the training of new chiefs of mission, outlines the organization's vision and invites open dialogue with staff.<sup>32</sup>

Finally, leadership training that ensures the strengthening of necessary senior management skills is occurring in a few agencies. The IMF has recently progressed with leadership training programmes. Most leaders are supported with and trained in organizational rules by their executive office staff and/or their chief of staff when they arrive. For instance, UNHCR's chief of staff provides informal on-the-job training in UN rules and protocols to new high commissioners. UNHCR's Global Learning Centre in Budapest has consolidated the agency's learning activities and programmes, and has a position dedicated to developing and delivering training programmes for senior management. Many organizations are prioritizing senior staff development. The EBRD, for example, has a learning and development

team that works closely with the evaluation department to design measures addressing current weaknesses in programme delivery.

#### e. Setting Strategic Priorities

Most organizations have a mission statement and strategic goals that identify the *raison d'être* and ultimate objectives. To deliver on these, the organizations' heads must translate the overarching organizational mission into a clear, detailed and measurable operational plan, and evaluate progress on a regular basis. International organizations vary greatly in their ability to do this. Some organizations have very broad strategic documents, with weak strategic direction, no measurable objectives and no mechanism to evaluate progress. Others have developed more detailed and measurable strategies, with timelines and budgets. Board members most often work with executive leadership to set strategic frameworks and evaluate progress towards them. Yet, their input varies greatly – in some cases, member states may lead on formulating strategic goals (e.g. IOM's 12-point plan), and in others, the executive director will take the lead (for instance, the UNDP).

UNHCR and UNDP are committed to producing well-developed strategic documents. UNHCR details objectives in its Global Strategic Priorities, and evaluates progress towards them in global annual reports and strategic reviews. The priorities set out operational, support and management goals, and include specific "impact indicators" to evaluate progress.<sup>33</sup> The agency has also established the Global Management Accountability Framework (GMAF), which "comprehensively maps accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities across the organization and relates them to the corresponding management policies and guidance".<sup>34</sup> It works at country, regional and global levels to clarify the lines of accountability, responsibilities and functions. In addition, UNHCR has Focus, a software that integrates its results-based management at country and international levels. UNDP has a series of regular strategic plans covering about four years, and reports in depth on how it will implement, finance, measure and review progress towards these goals.<sup>35</sup>

In recent years, the IMF produced the Global Policy Agenda, the MD's vision of the institution's strategic priorities and actions. It serves as the basis for the biannual International Monetary and Financial Committee ministerial meetings that review and set the IMF's broad goals, which the executive board's work programme subsequently operationalizes. This helps the IMF to respond swiftly to changing circumstances. Similarly, with its president setting priorities, the EBRD has rapidly expanded lending to North African clients in need of greater assistance in their transition to democracy and free markets. The **ADB's** 2008 report, *Strategy2020: The Long-Term Strategic Framework of the Asian Development Bank 2008-2020*, provided a 12-year framework, with measurable organizational objectives, to guide the organization. A midterm review of the bank's performance, presented at the board of governors' annual meeting in 2013, found that 80% of ADB's operations in 2008-2012 were conducted in the five core areas outlined in the original strategic agenda: infrastructure, environment, regional cooperation, financial sector development and education.

An international organization's flexibility is also influenced by its funding model. Providing discretionary, or "earmarked", funding can rapidly spur specific activities and innovations. Discretionary and other tied funds – from private institutions, other multilaterals or trust funds – may enable leaders to expand into new areas and adapt to changing circumstances when they are explicitly sought for this purpose. However, because discretionary funds are tied to specific tasks, leaders may have little flexibility to redeploy these funds with changing external circumstances. Organizations with a small core budget, and highly reliant on discretionary financing, would be expected to respond more directly to donor demands to ensure their survival.

Most organizations studied had a high percentage of funds earmarked for specific issues or projects, implying that leadership has less flexibility and discretion in setting priorities. Over 97% of IOM's financing is from non-core contributions.<sup>36</sup> However, the organization's director-general has actively lobbied states for an increase in IOM's core funding, and has also established an audit and oversight committee.<sup>37</sup> Similar numbers are seen in other organizations: in 2012, only 2% of UNHCR's financing came from the UN regular budget, and 98% percent was voluntary; for WHO, 76% of financing was voluntary.<sup>38</sup>

WHO, as part of its extensive programme reform, has launched the "Financing Dialogue" initiative, spearheaded by Director-General Margaret Chan. Among other things, it aims to ensure that member states and other funders commit to fully aligning fund allocation to the approved programme budget. Funders should make their contributions public to increase transparency, and ensure the predictability and flexibility of their funds.<sup>39</sup>

## f. Engaging with a Wide Range of Stakeholders

Every multilateral organization engages in some way with its members and a wider group of stakeholders, including beneficiaries, private-sector organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other civil society groups. Some do this more effectively than others. The benefits from positive, well-structured engagement include better information, better-quality collaboration, heightened responsiveness, sharing responsibility, and better public understanding and cooperation with the agency. Most organizations have formal and informal mechanisms to engage with stakeholders – joint projects with NGOs and other multilateral organizations, discussions and dialogues at conferences, and structured forums to interact with leaders of academia and civil society. But as no established "most effective way" exists to conduct these engagements, the challenge is in measuring or attempting to report best practice. Evidence, however, points to the importance of regular, formal meetings between organizations and a diverse range of civil society actors. It becomes more difficult for civil society to have an impact when meetings are informal or irregular.

## g. Evaluating Independently and Effectively

In recent years, most international organizations have recognized that independent evaluations can provide timely, useful and robust information on their work.<sup>40</sup> The World Bank created the Operations Evaluation Unit in the 1970s under its president, Robert McNamara (1968-1981), and renamed it as the Independent Evaluation Group in 2001. The same year, the IMF created an evaluation group, which it has subsequently and independently audited on two occasions.<sup>41</sup>

Besides serving as external appraisals, evaluations are also another way to ensure that members are aware of the governance, effectiveness, impact and use of their funds. The independence of these evaluations is critical and important to maintain, as are the channels through which evaluators' findings are considered.

At the IMF, the Independent Evaluation Office (IEO) is independent from management and reports to the board. As indicated in the IEO's terms of reference, the office engages with executive management, the board and staff when they "respond to relevant parts of the evaluation".<sup>42</sup>

At the World Bank and EBRD, independent evaluation teams report directly to the board of directors. The Independent Evaluation Group (IEG) at the World Bank conducted a client survey in 2012 to determine both whether the bank was meeting clients' needs and how clients perceived its impact, as one of the ways of engaging with the organization. At EBRD, engagement is done through links with key people, i.e. the chief compliance officer reports directly to the president, as does the internal audit team. The vice-president for risk also sits on the executive committee.

The AfDB has recently tried to strengthen independent internal and external evaluations. The Quality Assurance and Results department has established a round-table review mechanism that brings together management from various relevant departments to review evaluations and set out, where necessary, action to address them.

The ADB has internal and external reviews. The internal compliance review panel investigates alleged non-compliance by the bank in its operational policies and procedures. It does not, however, investigate borrowing countries, the executing agency or private-sector clients, unless they are relevant to non-compliance. Externally, the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN) regularly evaluates the institution and individual members, especially large donors such as the United Kingdom and Australia, and conducts regular assessments to ensure their money is being spent safely and effectively.

Some organizations have recently taken steps to make sure they follow best practice. The UNDP, for example, revised its evaluation policy in 2011 to establish the Evaluation Office's independence and ensure that all evaluations have a response from management. The office's head reports directly and independently to the executive board. The administrator, however, is briefed before an evaluation is presented to the board, and the administrator's office prepares a management response to evaluations. The administrator has the right to reply to evaluations, and discusses follow-up actions with the board.

# 3. Appendix: Leadership Practices



## a. African Development Bank (AfDB)

### Organization

The AfDB is a regional development bank founded in 1963 to foster economic growth and regional integration on the continent. The group also consists of the African Development Fund and Nigerian Trust Fund.<sup>43</sup>

### Governance

Owned and financed by 79 member countries (54 African and 25 non-African),<sup>44</sup> the bank is currently headquartered in Tunis, Tunisia, having temporarily moved there from its official headquarters in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire. It has 37 field offices, 6 customized liaison offices, 2 regional resource centres, 56 departments, and an external representation office in Tokyo.

At the top of the AfDB's organizational structure is the board of governors, which comprises ministers and high-level officials of economic, financial and development institutions from shareholder countries. The board of governors meets once a year and delegates day-to-day decision-making to a 20-member board of directors. The president, who is always an African and who is elected by the board of governors, chairs the board of directors.

### Length of leadership mandate

A renewable five-year term.

### Income

As of December 2012, the AfDB's cumulative authorized capital was \$103 billion, while the subscribed capital stood at \$100.2 billion (60% subscribed by regional members and 40% by non-regional members).

### Number of staff

2,068 regular staff, as of December 2012.

### History of leadership

In the early to mid 1990s, AfDB faced severe financial crises, compounded by major management problems. Distrust among shareholders, board, management and staff had weakened executive functions, procedures and controls, as well as policy and oversight functions. By the early 2000s, the AfDB fixed its balance sheet and regained its AAA credit rating via mechanisms for institutional reform. This strategic initiative has been reinvigorated under the current president.

Previous presidents were: Mamoun Beheiry (from Sudan, 1964-1970); Abdelwahab Labidi (Tunisia, 1970-1976); Kwame Donkor Fordwor (Ghana, 1976-1979); Godwin Gondwe (Malawi; caretaker capacity, 1979-1980); Willa Mung'Omba (Zambia, 1980-1985); Babacar N'diaye (Senegal, 1985-1995) and Omar Kabbaj (Morocco, 1995-2005).

The current president is Donald Kaberuka (Rwanda, 2005-to date).

### Current trajectory

Kaberuka, Rwanda's finance minister in the decade following the genocide, has given the AfDB international prominence, and exponentially increased lending to the private sector, since taking over as president. Under his leadership, the bank has received more confidence from its shareholders, as evidenced by recent votes to increase its capital base and to replenish its resources. A growing number of African countries now see the bank as a lender and adviser of first choice, although it has fewer resources than the World Bank. The AfDB's strategy, covered in *At the Center of Africa's Transformation: Strategy for 2013-2022*,<sup>45</sup> proposes a variety of reforms of leadership mechanisms. The next board session will take place in Abidjan in September 2014.

Indicator	Published rules	Other factors
I.	The <b>leadership selection process</b> searches and tests for specific, relevant competencies against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process.	
1	Does the Multi-lateral Organization/ International Organization (MO/IO) publish the criteria/terms of reference for leadership online?	Neither terms of reference nor criteria for the president's position are found openly published.
2	What percentage of the membership is involved in leadership selection and re-election in practice?	Full membership, but with different voting power. The founding <i>Agreement Establishing the African Development Bank (1963)</i> states that the board of governors elects the president "by a majority of the total voting power of the members, including a majority of the total voting power of the regional members". <sup>46</sup> Each AfDB member country, however, has an equal number of basic votes (625) in addition to the/a number of votes proportionate to its paid-in shares. The bank lists voting powers of each state in its annual reports in a transparent table based on subscriptions and contributions. <sup>47</sup>
3	Is there a time-bound, published and exhaustive process for leadership selection that weighs competence against the published criteria?	No. The establishing <i>Agreement</i> only states that it should be "a person of the highest competence in matters pertaining to the activities, management and administration of the Bank and shall be a national of a regional member state". <sup>48</sup>
II.	The leader has clear <b>performance expectations</b> , which are transparent and consistent with MO/IO's overarching goals and which facilitate leadership accountability.	
1	Do the leaders set clear performance expectations for themselves, which are transparent and consistent?	There is no official procedure for setting performance expectations. In practice, candidates outline the issues or themes they consider important, and the president-elect is expected to outline their working plan at the swearing-in ceremony. <sup>49</sup>
2	Is there an expectation that the leader translates overarching goals of the organization into a manageable and clear strategy?	The current president has taken things further along with concrete steps in this direction: (a) the elaboration of the <i>Medium-Term Strategy 2008-2012 (MTS)</i> with the advice of a high-level panel of eminent people; and (b) the <i>AfDB Ten-Year Strategy (TYS) for 2013-2022</i> . <sup>50</sup> In addition, the new <i>AfDB People Strategy 2013-2017</i> proposes to "transform the leadership statement into tangible actions that managers can enact with staff on an ongoing basis", and that "each leader and manager will have clear people management goals in their annual objectives that link to these standards and goals". <sup>51</sup>

3	Is the leader obliged to disclose conflicts of interest?	Yes. The establishing <i>Agreement</i> states “the Bank, its President, Vice-Presidents, officers and staff shall not interfere in the political affairs of any member; nor shall they be influenced in their decisions by the political character of the member concerned”. <sup>52</sup> This principle of impartiality is enforced through the Staff Integrity and Ethics Office (SIEO) and the Anti-Corruption Department that investigates allegations of prohibited practices and related staff misconduct.	
4	Is the leader obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics?	Yes, equal for each staff member of the bank. There is an organization-wide whistle-blowing policy (2007), anti-corruption and fraud framework (2006) and an investigation office to look into the above. This was a product of a joint IFI anti-corruption task force (2006). The Bank also has a 1999 code of conduct for staff, as well as a 2007 code of conduct for executive directors.	
<b>III. The leader has a defined performance management programme and receives annual feedback on performance</b>			
1	Is the leadership subjected to annual performance appraisal?	Not formally, but the new <i>AfDB People Strategy 2013-2017</i> proposes that in the near future the “leadership behaviours will be translated into specific behavioural requirements, and progress will be measured through management effectiveness and employee engagement indices and 360 feedback, and supported by development interventions.” <sup>53</sup> Each VP now has to sign a “Performance Contract” annually with the president.	
2	Is remuneration or benefits tied to the outcomes of the performance management programme?	No evidence.	
3	Is the leader offered coaching and development opportunity to address weaknesses over time?	No official mechanisms established, but supplying “managers with coaches or mentors to provide confidential help to become more effective” is one of the initiatives of the new <i>AfDB People Strategy 2013-2017</i> (implementation began in the 3rd quarter of 2013). <sup>54</sup>	
<b>IV. Leadership re-election is based on transparent processes and metrics</b>			
1	Are performance management criteria considered by the full membership in the re-election process?	No evidence.	
2	Are other qualified candidates considered in the re-election process?	No evidence.	
<b>V. The leader has the authority and mechanisms to shift strategic priorities to meet changing circumstances</b>			
1	Does the leader have the authority to shift strategic priorities in light of external changes?	Yes. Mainly through structural changes in the Bank. Due to the establishing <i>Agreement</i> the AfDB President determines the organizational structure, functions and responsibilities as well as the regional and country representation offices. <sup>55</sup>	



2	Does the MO/IO have processes that facilitate implementation of new strategic priorities?	Yes. For example, the <i>Results Management Framework</i> will monitor implementation of the new <i>Strategy for 2013-2022</i> over the 3-year planning horizon reflected in the rolling plan and assess the development effectiveness of the institution.	
3	What percentage of resources are set aside for special initiatives decided by and controlled by a subset of the full membership?	The Fund has available resources entrusted to it under Article 8 of the founding Agreement (1963), which empowers the Fund to receive other resources including grants from State Participants, non-participating countries, and from any public or private body or bodies. <sup>56</sup> There has been an increase in trust funds capital in 2010 – 73% compared to 2009 – that triggered a trust funds reform. <sup>57</sup> As of 2012, the Bank mobilized a total of \$127.7 million from donors to replenish the existing thematic (\$130 million) and bilateral (\$22.6 million) Trust Funds. By the end of 2012, the African Development Bank had made substantial progress under its <i>Trust Fund Reform policy</i> by moving away from tied bilateral funds to multi-donor Trust Funds most of which are thematic in nature (for example, South-South Cooperation Trust Fund with Brazil (\$6 million) approved by the Board in March 2011).	
<b>VI. The leader is expected to attract, retain and develop talent through-out the organization</b>			
1	Does the organization take staff surveys to assess staff satisfaction and performance and do leaders utilize the results of these surveys?	Yes. The first staff survey was conducted in 2007. In 2010 President Kaberuka committed to a regular corporate accountability exercise, involving both client survey and a staff survey. <sup>58</sup> The most recent staff survey was completed in December 2013 with results expected to be published in February 2014.	There have been a number of staff surveys in the past and we are planning to institutionalize the process and include results (staff engagement survey) as part of our <i>Results Measurement Framework</i> – the fundamental benchmark against which we assess our own performance. One of the 2013-2022 Strategy <sup>59</sup> goals is: to put focus on “performance priorities, talent management and succession planning”. <sup>60</sup>
2	Is the leader assessed on mentoring and coaching of subordinate staff?	No evidence.	

VII.	<p><i>MO/IO has structures that encourage leadership to <b>engage with diverse range of stakeholders</b></i></p> <p>No. According to the <i>Framework for Enhanced Engagement with Civil Society Organizations (2012)</i>, the Bank has no mechanisms to ensure systematic CSOs engagement, but aims at strengthening and institutionalizing it.<sup>61</sup> The document encourages the staff (management included) to engage with stakeholders.<sup>62</sup> Compliance Review and Mediation Unit (CRMU) administers <i>Independent Review Mechanism (IRM)</i> through which people adversely affected by a project financed by the AfDB can request the Bank to comply with its own policies and procedures.</p>
VIII.	<p><i>MO/IO has structures that engage leadership thoroughly with <b>internal/external evaluations</b></i></p> <p>The Bank has structures to deal with both internal/independent and external evaluations.<sup>63</sup> For independent evaluations there is a <i>Management Response</i> and a <i>Management Action Record (MAR)</i> that is published and discussed with the Board. The MAR sets out time-bound actions the Bank will (or will not) take in response to Recommendations made by Independent Evaluators. Management and Evaluators then jointly track implementation of these Management Commitments. For external Evaluations (e.g. UK Multilateral Aid Review, Australian Multilateral Aid Review or MOPAN) the Bank prepares Management Responses (though not usually an MAR). <i>Quality Assurance and Results Department</i> has established a <i>Roundtable Review Mechanism</i> that brings together management from various relevant departments to review the evaluations and set out, where necessary, action to address them.</p>



## b. Asian Development Bank (ADB)

### Organization

Founded in 1966 by 31 countries to support economic growth and regional integration in Asia, the ADB now has 67 members. It provides loans, grants, technical assistance and equity investments to sovereigns, central banks, non-profit organizations and private-sector clients. The ADB draws from ordinary capital resources (OCR) and eight special funds, including the Asian Development Fund (ADF).<sup>64</sup> The bank is headquartered in Manila, Philippines.

### Governance

The ADB grants all powers to the board of governors, composed of one representative of each member. The board may delegate any or all powers to the board of directors, except those powers exclusively reserved for the governors.<sup>65</sup> The board of directors handles day-to-day management in practice, and is composed of 12 members elected by the board of governors (eight by regional members and four by non-regional members) for renewable two-year terms.<sup>66</sup> The bank's president chairs the board of directors but has no vote, except in the event of an equal division, in which case the president has the deciding vote.

### Length of leadership mandate

Five years; re-electable.

### Income

\$9.4 billion in approved OCR loans in 2012. Total subscribed capital in the same year was \$163.129 billion, with an operating income of \$464.7 million.<sup>67</sup>

### Number of staff

3,045.

### History of leadership

Every president has been Japanese. The past presidents were: Takeshi Watanabe (1966-1972), Shiro Inoue (1972-1976), Tarochi Yoshida (1976-1981), Masau Fujioka (1981-1989), Kimimasa Tarumizu (1989-1993), Mitsuo Sato (1993-1999), Tadao Chino (1999-2005) and Haruhiko Kuroda (2005-2013).

The current president is Takehiko Nakao (2013-present).

The election of Nakao, the ninth-consecutive uncontested Japanese candidate in a row, has led many to question the informal convention of Japan selecting the ADB president.<sup>68</sup> For example, Eswar Prasad, Tolani Senior Professor of Trade Policy, Cornell University, and contributor to the Asian Development Bank Institute<sup>69</sup>, told the *Financial Times*: "The Chinese have long wanted [control of] the ADB."<sup>70</sup> China has not publicly confirmed this desire. However, during an address at the ADB's 2014 Astana conference, Chinese representative Jiwei Lou noted: "Emerging economies in the region are in a position to be ADB's financing partners, but their voice and representation need to be increased through the reform of ADB's governance structure so as to enable them to undertake more responsibilities for ADB's development."<sup>71</sup>

Further, many see China's proposal for an Asian Infrastructure Investment Bank (AIIB) as a challenge to what is perceived to be a Japanese-dominated ADB.<sup>72</sup> Nakao has publicly welcomed the new bank.<sup>73</sup> However, Robert Orr, US Ambassador to the ADB, has noted that China may be creating the AIIB out of frustration, due to its inability to increase its capital contribution (and thus voting power) in the existing institution.<sup>74</sup>

### Current trajectory

Nakao recently pledged to actively explore options to address the bank's "resource challenge" and take advantage of opportunities to co-finance with bilateral and private-sector sources.<sup>75</sup> Further, at the 47th Annual Meeting of the Board of Governors in 2014, Nakao announced plans to combine the concessional ADF and LIBOR-based OCR. The merger of the funds aims to increase ADB's equity base without its having to request additional funds from members.<sup>76</sup> Ultimately, this would enhance the bank's capacity to provide concessional financing for development projects.

	Indicator	Published rules	Other factors
I.	<b>The leadership selection process</b> searches and tests for specific, relevant competencies against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process		
1	Does the MO/IO publish the criteria/terms of reference for leadership online?	No evidence.	
2	What percentage of the membership is involved in leadership selection and re-election in practice?	Formally, full membership. (a) Each Governor can nominate a candidate. (b) Each member country has one vote. The President is elected by a simple majority of Governors representing no less than a majority of total voting power of all members. <sup>77</sup> Further, the President must be a national of a regional member country (e.g., there cannot be an American President). <sup>78</sup>	Much like the World Bank's tradition of selecting an American President, the ADB is commonly understood to operate under the informal convention that the President is selected by Japan (Yasutomo 1993, 1995; Wan 1995; Kilby 2006, 2011; Lim & Vreeland 2013). Every President has been Japanese, and most have come directly from the Finance Ministry of Japan. <sup>79</sup> Lim & Vreeland (2013) write that in addition to its large formal voting power, Japan "exerts informal influence through its de facto appointment of the ADB president." <sup>80</sup> ADB Director of Strategy Kazu Sakai strongly disagreed with the notion that Japan 'de facto' appoints the President. He reminded via interview that every regional member can put forward a candidate, and that "no other candidate does not mean there was no election; there was [still] an election and voting." Numerous academics and observers maintain, however, that the strong informal influence and large monetary contribution of Japan allows it to pick the President uncontested. <sup>81</sup> But as Sakai correctly notes, there is no formal evidence that would confirm such an informal arrangement, aside from the fact that there has never been a non-Japanese candidate proposed by any member.
3	Is there a time-bound, published, exhaustive process for leadership selection that weighs competence against the published criteria?	No evidence.	

II. The leader has clear <b>performance expectations</b> which are transparent and consistent with MO/O's overarching goals and which facilitates leadership accountability	
1	<p>Do the leaders set clear performance expectations for themselves, which are transparent and consistent?</p> <p>Yes. The ADB is largely guided by goals stated in its 'Strategy2020'<sup>82</sup> report. To measure the Bank's performance, a 'Results Framework' approved by the Board of Director is also published.<sup>83</sup> The Bank also features a 'Development Effectiveness Review',<sup>84</sup> an Independent Evaluation Department (IED)<sup>85</sup>, a Compliance Review Panel (CRP)<sup>86</sup>, a transparency policy<sup>87</sup>, and a new Vice-President for Administration and Corporate Management.</p>
2	<p>Is there an expectation that the leader translates overarching goals of organization into a manageable and clear strategy?</p> <p>Yes. In October the current President addressed how the ADB can fulfil the goals of Strategy2020 in a written statement submitted to the 88<sup>th</sup> meeting of the World Bank Development Committee in Washington D.C.<sup>88</sup> At the ADB's 2014 Annual General Meeting of the Board of Governors in Astana, Nakao outlined ten priority action areas to fulfil the goals of Strategy2020 in light of its mid-term review.<sup>89</sup></p>
3	<p>Is the leader obliged to disclose conflicts of interest?</p> <p>Yes. The 2011 Code of Conduct requires the President and Directors to disclose any such conflicts to the ADB Ethics Committee.<sup>90</sup> There are also guidelines for the avoidance of conflicts of interest in independent evaluations<sup>91</sup>, and all staff involved in lending activities are required to disclose such interests.</p>
4	<p>Is the leader obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics?</p> <p>Yes. There is an Ethics committee that has published rules on gifts and entertainment<sup>92</sup>, access during investigations<sup>93</sup>, guidelines for allegations of misconduct<sup>94</sup> and general code of conduct for all employees.<sup>95</sup></p>
III. The leader has a defined <b>performance management</b> programme and receives annual feedback on performance	
1	<p>Is the leadership subjected to annual performance appraisal?</p> <p>No evidence.</p>
2	<p>Is remuneration or benefits tied to the outcomes of the performance management programme?</p> <p>Salary increases for most employees are tied to performance but it is unclear if this applies to the President. The President's exact salary is not available but the highest salary category (IS10) ranged from \$257,800 – \$322,300 according to a 2014 proposal.<sup>96</sup> Executive salaries remain an exclusive right of the Board of Governors.</p>
3	<p>Is the leader offered coaching and development opportunity to address weaknesses over time?</p> <p>No evidence.</p>
IV. Leadership <b>re-election process</b> is based on transparent processes and metrics	
1	<p>Are performance management criteria considered by the full membership in the re-election process?</p> <p>No evidence.</p> <p>The Committee on Remuneration, established via Resolution No. 66 (and amended by Resolutions 155 and 175) undertakes an annual review of the President and Board of Directors' salaries. It may submit a proposal to the Board of Governors for adjustments to the Board of Directors every year and the President every other year.<sup>97</sup></p>

2	Are other qualified candidates considered in the re-election process?	There has never been another candidate put forward in the event of an election or re-election.	
V.	The leader has the authority and mechanisms to <b>shift strategic priorities</b> to meet changing circumstances		
1	Does the leader have the authority to shift strategic priorities in light of external changes?	Yes. The President is entrusted with the authority to conduct the 'business of the bank.' <sup>98</sup> However, major changes to strategic priorities (or continuations of existing strategic priorities) require approval by the Board of Directors.	The President of the ADB is widely understood to exercise significant personal power within the organization. <sup>99</sup> One former director-general, speaking under condition of anonymity in 2010, told Lim and Vreeland (2013): "the ADB is like a state, and the ADB President is like its emperor." <sup>100</sup> This interpretation was strongly contested, however, by ADB Director of Strategy Kazu Sakai in an interview conducted for this report. Sakai stressed that the ADB's 12-member Board of Directors (elected by the Governors) must approve all major decisions proposed by the President, and that the above quote is a "complete misrepresentation of the ADB." <sup>101</sup>
2	Does the MO/IO have processes that facilitate implementation of new strategic priorities?	Yes. The President can put forward a strategic agenda and take steps to fulfil its goals, as exemplified by Strategy2020. Further, the ADB publishes a Work Programme and Budget Framework that describes how the ADB will implement its strategic priorities. <sup>102</sup>	
3	What percentage of resources are set aside for special initiatives decided by and controlled by a subset of the full membership?	Approximately \$4 billion (28.6%) of ADB funding is Special Fund Resources funded by a subset of full membership. <sup>103</sup>	The largest special initiative is the Asian Development Fund (ADF). The cumulative total of the ADF is approximately \$33 billion. The Fund is controlled to a large extent by a subset of full membership. But at the end of each replenishment negotiation process, undertaken once every four years, the agreement between ADB management and ADF donors is put into a report called the 'Donors' Report.' This 'Donors' Report' is then submitted to the Board members for approval. Thus major decisions regarding the ADF (e.g., replenishments) and individual ADF projects are ultimately approved by the full set of ADB members via their Board of Directors representatives. <sup>104</sup>
VI.	The leader is expected to <b>attract, retain and develop talent</b> through-out the organization		
1	Does the organization take staff surveys to assess staff satisfaction and performance and do leaders utilize the results of these surveys?	Yes. The ADB conducts 'Staff Engagement Surveys' every two years. <sup>105</sup> In response to the results of these surveys, ADB Management take steps to address staff dissatisfaction at both the institutional and department level.	

2	Is the leader assessed on mentoring and coaching of subordinate staff?	No Evidence.	
VII.	<i>MO/IO has structures that encourage leadership to engage with diverse range of stakeholders</i>	<p>In 2006 the ADB released a guide on strengthening stakeholder engagement, focusing on the participation of a diverse range of stakeholders in the six stages of the ADB Project Cycle: 1. Country Programming; 2. Project Processing; 3. Operational Planning; 4. Implementation, Monitoring and Reporting; 5. Self-Evaluation; and 6. Post-Evaluation. When reviewing a policy, strategy or country programme, the ADB aims to consult with stakeholders to identify who has interests in a given activity; determine stakeholder group interests; capitalize on stakeholder's experience and expertise; gain stakeholder consensus on projects; and maximize transparency.<sup>106</sup></p> <p>In the most recent survey, three-quarters of stakeholders agree that the ADB is doing enough to reach out and build partnerships with the private sector, but of private sector respondents, that number is only one-third.<sup>107</sup></p>	
VIII.	<i>MO/IO has structures that engage leadership thoroughly with internal/external evaluations</i>	<p><b>Internal:</b> The Compliance Review Panel (CRP), an internal watchdog of the ADB, investigates alleged noncompliance by the bank in its operation policies and procedures that has caused, or is likely to cause, direct material harm to project-affected people. It does not, however, investigate borrowing countries, the executing agency or private sector clients unless relevant to accusations of noncompliance. Complaints can be filed via the 'Accountability Mechanism' but must be expressed in writing and sent to the Complaints Receiving Officer (CRO). There are two additional levels of internal evaluation in the organization. The first is self-evaluation, conducted by those responsible for individual country strategies, programmes or projects. The second is independent evaluation conducted by the Independent Evaluation Department (IED), a member of the Evaluation Cooperation Group of the Multilateral Development Banks (ECG). The IED operates according to standards of insulation from external influence and the avoidance of conflicts of interest. IED managers and evaluators exclude themselves, for example, from evaluating any project/programme/activity/entity that they worked on.<sup>108</sup></p> <p><b>External:</b> Donors evaluate performance during the regular rounds of capital replenishment. Further, a subset of donors created the Multilateral Organisation Performance Assessment Network (MOPAN), which regularly conducts evaluation reviews of institutions (such as the ADB) to which said donors contribute funds.<sup>109</sup> A member of the ADB's top management noted via interview that some individual donor countries have begun to conduct regular assessments, citing the United Kingdom and Australia as the most notable cases. "They want to increase the volume of their development assistance but want to contain their [own] administrative budget. The solution is to channel their funds through international organizations like us [ADB]. But in order to do that they want to evaluate the performance of international organizations, and they want to put their money in organizations they think are doing a good job... We are regularly subject to such assessments." There is also the International Aid Transparency Initiative (IATI), of which the ADB became a member in 2013.<sup>110</sup></p>	

## C. European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD)

### Organization

A multilateral development bank, the EBRD uses investment as a tool to help build market economies in the region of operations stretching from central Europe to central Asia, and the southern and eastern Mediterranean.

### Governance

The EBRD's president reports to a board of governors and directs an executive committee that oversees the important aspects of strategy, performance and financial analysis. While the board of governors represents donor nations, it delegates most of its authority to the board of directors. The bank is organized into seven operational groups including banking, finance, risk and policy, among others.

The board of governors also appoints or reappoints the president. Most other powers are devolved to the board of directors, which oversees the operations of the president and the executive committee (made up of the heads of the major internal operational groups).

### Length of leadership mandate

Four years and renewable, with no limit on the number of terms a president can hold. The vice-president has a five-year term.

### Income

€9.1 billion in investments were made in 2011.

### Number of staff

Approximately 1,700 on permanent contracts, with 1,250 at the London headquarters and 400 in country offices. A significant number of additional employees are on temporary contracts.

### History of leadership

EBRD presidents have typically served four-year terms; only Jean Lemierre has served the full eight-year double term. Past presidents include Jacques Attali (1991-1993), Jacques de Larosière (1993-1998), Horst Köhler (1998-2000), Jean Lemierre (2000-2008) and Thomas Mirow (2008-2012).

The current president, Sir Suma Chakrabarti, was elected in 2012.

### Current trajectory

All leaders prior to Sir Suma were either French or German, and had banking backgrounds. Sir Suma represents a change in emphasis, given his extensive experience in managing large public-sector organizations. He has introduced a wide-ranging reform programme to improve organizational efficiency and delivery, including a shift to greater transparency in hiring executive management, and greater emphasis on performance management of senior leadership.



	Indicator	Published rules	Other factors
I.	<b>The leadership selection process</b> searches and tests for specific, relevant competencies against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process		
1	Does the MO/IO publish the criteria/terms of reference for leadership online?	There are no terms of reference for the President's role. Employment contract is published online including salary, terms of dismissal. There are terms of reference for the Vice Presidents. Board of Governors, Board of Directors and President's role is laid out 'Basic Documents of EBRD' in some detail, but there is no detailed discussion of any other roles. <sup>111</sup>	They are considering writing terms of reference for the President's role in future. This most likely would be drafted by senior EBRD staff member. The Principals would delegate this role to the Board of Directors whom predominantly serve national interests.
2	What percentage of the membership is involved in leadership selection and re-election in practice?	Formally, the Board of Governors has rounds of majority voting to eliminate candidates and determine the President for 4-year terms (and re-appointment terms). <sup>112</sup>	Sir Suma Chakrabarti is the first non-French or German President of the Bank. Traditionally France and Germany agreed on the candidate. However, in the most last election there was a competitive process as the 'gentlemen's agreement' broke down. <sup>113</sup>
3	Is there a time-bound, published, exhaustive process for leadership selection that weighs competence against the published criteria?	President selection remains non-exhaustive and without a clear formal process. At the Vice Presidential level greater rigor has been introduced to the leadership process. There is a clear formal process for VP level leaders that was effectively tested for VP CFO, VP CAO, VP Risk, and VP Policy as well as the General Counsel. For example, an exhaustive, passport-blind interview search of over 850 applicants was conducted for VP of banking operations (a role traditionally held by an American) in 2012. <sup>114</sup>	In the last election the role was advertised to shareholders, several candidates wrote manifestos to voters outlining their vision for the Bank, and four of the five gave interviews to the Centre for Global Development, followed by hearings with the EBRD Board <sup>115</sup> This was the most publicly transparent election process. However it is not a codified process.
II.	<b>The leader has clear performance expectations</b> which are transparent and consistent with MO/IO's overarching goals and which facilitates leadership accountability		
1	Do the leaders set clear performance expectations for themselves, which are transparent and consistent?	No publicly available evidence.	Sir Suma Chakrabati made his goals clear through his election Manifesto to shareholders.
2	Is there an expectation that the leader translates overarching goals of the organization into a manageable and clear strategy?	No evidence.	The performance objectives for the Executive Management are published on the intranet and effectively reflect the President's goals (taken as a sum). These performance objectives are then cascaded down to the rest of the organization. The strategic planning cycle does not link to the presidential election cycle. The Bank has a five year "Capital, Resources, Review", which it must deliver on. However, an incoming President has limited flexibility to reset these goals and adapt to changing circumstances.
3	Is the leader obliged to disclose conflicts of interest?	Disclosures of conflict of interest are mandated under the formal Code of Conduct.	The EBRD has an annual disclosure, which is scrutinized by the chief compliance officer, and there is a procedure for follow-up and enforcement.

4	Is the leader obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics?	EBRD has a defined formal Code of Conduct (which was updated in 2012) overseen by a Chief Compliance Officer who reports directly to the President. Responsible for reputational risks and staff misbehaviour and overseeing the Project Compliance Mechanism. <sup>116</sup>	EBRD practices are sometimes stricter than the formal Code of Conduct as it can be politically sensitive for senior staff to be non-executive members of Boards in the private or charity sector (even if officially they may be able to do so).
III.	The leader has a defined <b>performance management</b> programme and receives annual feedback on performance		
1	Is the leadership subjected to annual performance appraisal?	Details about performance management are not outlined online or publicly.	There is no formal appraisal of the President. This would be difficult for the Board of Directors or Principals' to carry out as they do not have sufficient information on the President's role. <sup>117</sup>
2	Is remuneration or benefits tied to the outcomes of the performance management programme?	Annual report discusses 'rewards and benefits' designed to encourage superior performance, but it is not clear whether the policy includes leadership. <sup>118</sup>	The President must have Board approval for an increase in salary. <sup>119</sup>
3	Is the leader offered coaching and development opportunity to address weaknesses over time?	EBRD has a learning and development team who work closely with the Evaluation Department (EVD) team to design programmes that address existing weaknesses in programme delivery. They do not focus on the President.	The President and other senior management have coaching available on request. Many senior staff have personal coaches.
IV.	<b>Leadership re-election process</b> is based on transparent processes and metrics		
1	Are performance management criteria considered by the full membership in the re-election process?	The re-appointment process is similar to the appointment process in that the Board of Governors require a majority vote, but frequently informal negotiations prior to the formal vote are decisive.	No as there is not a formal performance appraisal of the President.
2	Are other qualified candidates considered in the re-election process?	The EBRD considered a full range of candidates for re-appointment in the last election. For example, Sir Suma Chakrabarti was selected over the incumbent President in 2012, Thomas Mirrow.	However, there is no codified rule that other candidates must be considered in the re-election process. It is likely that the next election will also be open and contested. <sup>120</sup>
V.	The leader has the authority and mechanisms to <b>shift strategic priorities</b> to meet changing circumstances		
1	Does the leader have the authority to shift strategic priorities in light of external changes?	The President has authority to shift strategic priorities. For example, in conjunction with Board of Governors/ Directors, President has expanded lending to North African clients as the need to assist them in transitioning to democracy and free-markets has emerged.	Due to the mismatch between strategic planning and the election cycle it is extremely difficult for the President to adapt the EBRD's strategic priorities. It can occur in reaction to a major crisis such as the Arab Spring.
2	Does the MO/IO have processes that facilitate implementation of new strategic priorities?	Yes. The President carries out <i>structural</i> reforms to facilitate implementation of new strategic priorities and evolve after the global financial crisis and the continuing great recession. For instance, the President has developed a new policy role that the Board approved as well as a new Corporate Leadership Group. In addition, the President has developed 12 internal taskforces to review internal processes and structures. A new policy operational group has also been created to better convey the EBRD's policy expertise to client countries.	There is no budget for special initiatives. Furthermore the Board control the budget, salary of staff and total number of fixed employees. This makes it extremely difficult for the President to make strategic changes with existing staff as the EBRD is only able to hire staff on short-term contracts.

3	What percentage of resources are set aside for special initiatives decided by and controlled by a subset of the full membership?	The EBRD features 17 Special Funds earmarked by specific project type and/or geographic area and funded by subsets of donors (totalling €827 million in 2011, equivalent to 9% of the €9.1 billion in total commitments). In addition to these funds, the EBRD runs a number of bilateral and multilateral technical assistance funds in the Southern and Mediterranean (SEMED) region, totalling €2.574 billion in 2011. <sup>121</sup>	
VI.	The leader is expected to <b>attract, retain and develop talent</b> through-out the organization		
1	Does the organization take staff surveys to assess staff satisfaction and performance and do leaders utilize the results of these surveys?	Yes. The EBRD has shifted from surveys every 3 years to annually. <sup>122</sup>	These surveys have been used.
2	Is the leader assessed on mentoring and coaching of subordinate staff?	No evidence.	The President is not formally assessed on this (or anything else), however Sir Suma Chakrabati has dedicated time to mentoring senior staff.
VII.	<i>MO/IO has structures that encourage leadership to <b>engage with diverse range of stakeholders</b></i>		
		The EBRD has a Civil Society Programme where executive managers spend two days with civil society groups to garner feedback on EBRD performance. It also conducts a business forum where the President and Board of Directors interact with business leaders. In 2012 the EBRD significantly enhanced its civil society initiatives. The EBRD Mining Operations Policy was implemented that year in consultation with more than 1,500 organizations including mining companies, civil society groups and academics. Further, Phase 3 of the Sustainable Energy Initiative (SEI) was launched, with consultative meetings in Georgia, Kazakhstan, Russia, Turkey and Ukraine. The EBRD also reviewed its political methodology in 2012, holding workshops in London, Stanford, Belgrade, Moscow and Cairo. According to its 2013 prospectus, the EBRD also planned on reviewing three policies last year in consultation with civil society groups and a wide variety of other stakeholders: the 2009 Project Complaint Mechanism Rules of Procedure, the 2008 Environmental and Social Policy, and the 2011 Public Information Policy. <sup>123</sup>	
VIII.	<i>MO/IO has structures that engage leadership thoroughly with <b>internal/external evaluations</b></i>		
		EBRD has a defined Evaluation Policy that has regularly been updated since 1992 (EBRD Evaluation Policy, 2013). EBRD has an Evaluation Department (EVD) which reports to a Chief Evaluator which is part of a complementary web of instruments – e.g. work programmes and budgets, results frameworks, performance scorecards, etc. The evaluation team reports directly to the Board of Directors. In addition, the Chief Compliance Officer reports directly to the President, as does the internal audit team. The Vice-President for Risk also sits on the Executive Committee. EBRD also featured in the 2006 Multilateral Development Bank (MDB) Common Performance Assessment (COMPAS) report, where MDBs jointly publish information on how they conduct business and organize themselves to ensure that their operations are geared towards results. <sup>124</sup>	



Inter-American Development Bank

#### d. Inter-American Development Bank (IDB)

##### **Organization**

Founded in 1959 as a partnership between Latin American countries and the United States, the IDB supports client governments, private entities and non-profit sectors with capital for development operations. The Inter-American Development Bank Group (IADB) is composed of the IDB, the Inter-American Investment Corporation (IIC) and the Multilateral Investment Fund (MIF), the latter being administered by the IDB. The group is headquartered in the United States (Washington DC).

##### **Governance**

The IADB is headed by a board of governors, which delegates oversight of bank operations to a board of executive directors (representatives from 48 countries). The management team runs day-to-day operations. Elected by the board of governors, the president chairs the meetings of the board of executive directors, but has no vote.

##### **Length of leadership mandate**

Five years; can be re-elected.

##### **Income**

\$11.4 billion in lending was approved in 2012. The subscribed capital to the IDB, after the ninth general capital increase, will amount to \$170.9 billion.

##### **Number of staff**

About 2,000.

##### **History of leadership**

The three prior presidents served several terms: Felipe Herrera (from Chile, 1960-1971); Antonio Ortiz Mena (Mexico, 1971-1988) and Enrique V. Iglesias (Uruguay, 1988-2005).

The current president, Luis Alberto Moreno (Colombia; 2005-present), has also served more than one term.

In the 1970 elections, both Argentina and Venezuela nominated different candidates, but on 27 November, Ortiz received the majority of votes. David M. Kennedy, US secretary of the treasury, reported to President Richard Nixon that the election had been "contentious".<sup>125</sup>

The Andean Development Corporation (CAF) funded more Latin American infrastructure projects in 2012 than the IADB and World Bank combined.<sup>126</sup> According to Humphrey and Michaelowa (2013), the attractiveness of CAF vis-à-vis the IADB is its fast processing times and low societal and environmental standards. Such advantages, the authors argue, are perhaps made possible by CAF's lack of non-regional members.<sup>127</sup>

##### **Current trajectory**

Since Moreno assumed the presidency in October 2005, the bank has undergone a major reshaping of its organizational structure, and has established a reform agenda linked to the ninth general increase in resources mandate.

	Indicator	Published rules	Other factors
I.	<b>The leadership selection process</b> searches and tests for specific, relevant competencies against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process		
1	Does the MO/O publish the criteria/terms of reference for leadership online?	No. The Chairman submits the terms of the contract for employment for the President to the Board of Governors in a <i>confidential</i> manner. <sup>128</sup>	
2	What percentage of the membership is involved in leadership election and re-election in practice?	Full membership. (a) Each Governor can nominate a candidate. (b) Each member country has equal amount of votes (135) plus one vote for each share of ordinary capital (OC) stock of the Bank. The majority of total voting power of member countries elects the President, including an absolute majority of governors of regional members. <sup>133</sup> Voting power among member countries of the IDB is as follows: Latin American and the Caribbean have 50.015%, United States 30.006%, Canada 4.001% and the non-regional members 15.979%.	Some observers celebrate the IADB's governance structure, arguing that it better preserves the interests of regional members than other multilateral institutions. Nancy Birdsall (2014), for example, notes that in the IADB regional members hold a majority of the voting power, whereas non-borrowing members collectively hold a majority in the World Bank. <sup>129</sup> Numerous authors have warned, however, that voting weight is an insufficient measure of power and influence within an organization (Schotter 1981; Hosli 1996). <sup>130</sup> Strand (2003), employing the Johnston voting power index, calculates the actual distribution of voting power in the IADB based on individual countries' voting power within coalition groups and the power of the coalition group itself. According to this calculation, the United States holds 80% of voting power within the IADB. <sup>131</sup> Further, as Birdsall (2014) notes herself, the US, via its de facto veto power, controls the selection of the IADB's Executive Vice-President (EVP). This is significant given that the EVP chairs the Loan Committee that must approve any project before it reaches the Board of Governors for final approval. <sup>132</sup>
3	Is there a time-bound, published, exhaustive process for leadership election that weighs competence against the published criteria?	Yes. The comprehensive set of regulations <sup>134</sup> together with the agreement establishing the Bank <sup>135</sup> is published online.	

II. The leader has clear <b>performance expectations</b> which are transparent and consistent with MO/O's overarching goals and which facilitates accountability	
1	Do the leaders set clear performance expectations for themselves, which are transparent and consistent?
2	Is there an expectation that the leader translates overarching goals of organization into a manageable and clear strategy?
3	Is the leader obliged to disclose conflicts of interest?
4	Is the leader obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics?
III. The leader has a defined <b>performance management</b> programme and receives annual feedback on performance	
1	Is the leader subjected to annual performance appraisal?
2	Is remuneration or benefits tied to the outcomes of the performance management programme?
3	Is the leader offered coaching and development opportunity to address weaknesses over time?
IV. Leadership <b>re-election</b> is based on transparent processes and metrics	
1	Are performance management criteria considered by the full membership in the re-appointment process?
2	Are other qualified candidates considered in the re-election process?

V. The leader has the authority and mechanisms to <b>shift strategic priorities</b> to meet changing circumstances	
1	Does the leader have the authority to shift strategic priorities in light of external changes? The President makes proposals on the general policy of the Bank for consideration by the Board.
2	Does the MO/IO have processes that facilitate implementation of new strategic priorities? No evidence.
3	What percentage of resources are set aside for special initiatives decided by and controlled by a subset of the full membership? Of the 2012 total approvals, \$10.8 billion was from the Ordinary Capital (OC), \$320 million from the <i>Fund for Special Operations (FSO)</i> (before 1965 was called Social Progress Trust Fund). <sup>141</sup> Contributions to the FSO are made in the form of non-negotiable, non-interest bearing demand obligations in lieu of the immediate payment of all or any part of a member's contributions quotas. The Board allocates the resources. <sup>142</sup> (Stephen D. Krasner writes that for the FSO activities voting, the United States have a blocking veto.) <sup>143</sup>
VI. The leader is expected to <b>attract, retain and develop talent</b> through-out the organization	
1	Does the organization take staff surveys to assess staff satisfaction and performance and do leaders utilize the results of these surveys? Yes. Working on the Human Capital Strategy (2011), <sup>144</sup> a broad consultation process was undertaken by Management to identify the key challenges perceived by staff through an electronic survey sent out to 500 employees.
2	Is the leader assessed on mentoring and coaching of subordinate staff? No evidence.
VII. <i>MO/IO has structures that encourage management to engage with diverse range of stakeholders</i>	
	Most importantly, civil society organizations (CSOs) may also be eligible to receive financing from the Bank. Also, according to the Strategy for Promoting Citizen Participation in Bank Activities (2004), <sup>145</sup> There are four areas of Bank activity in which citizen participation can be systematically incorporated: (i) Bank input into the shaping of country development policies, plans and agendas; (ii) sector strategy and country strategy formulation, (iii) project preparation and implementation, and (iv) evaluation of Bank activities. There are annual CSO meetings and CSO Consulting Groups functioning through the year.
VIII. <i>MO/IO has structures that engage executive management thoroughly with internal/external evaluations</i>	
	Evaluation at the IDB is a shared responsibility between management and the <i>Office of Evaluation and Oversight (OVE)</i> . Management focuses on project evaluations and monitoring portfolio performance. OVE is independent of management and answers to the Board of Executive Directors. Its activities include ensuring that strategies, policies and programmes comply with the IDB's objectives and mandates. OVE oversees the Bank's internal monitoring mechanisms and conducts ex-post project evaluations. OVE has organizational and behavioural independence, and is free from external pressure and conflicts of interest according to the criteria established by the Evaluation Cooperation Group of the Multilateral Development Banks (ECG), of which the IDB is a founding member.



## e. International Monetary Fund (IMF)

### Organization

Established after the Second World War as part of the international economic infrastructure agreed at Bretton Woods (United States), the IMF is committed to promoting international monetary cooperation and high levels of employment and income, as well as facilitating international trade.<sup>146</sup>

### Governance

The board of governors is the IMF's highest decision-making body. It consists of one governor and one alternate governor for each of the 188 member countries. The governors, appointed by their respective member countries, are usually ministers of finance or the heads of their countries' central bank. The board retains the right to approve quota increases, the admittance of new members, compulsory withdrawal of members, and amendments to the Articles of Agreement and By-Laws. The board is advised by two ministerial committees: the International Monetary and Financial Committee (IMFC) and the Development Committee.

The executive board consists of 24 executive directors representing all 188 member countries, and conducts the IMF's business. Currently, the five largest quota contributors appoint their own executive director, and the other countries elect an executive director based on constituencies. Under the quota and governance reforms, adopted in 2010 but not yet in force, all 24 executive directors would be elected by member countries, making the IMF the only international institution with an all-elected board.<sup>147</sup>

The IMF is led by the managing director (MD), who is the head of staff and chairman of the executive board. The MD is assisted by a first deputy managing director and three deputy managing directors. The management team oversees the staff and maintains high-level contact with member countries, private-sector organizations, the media, civil society organizations, think tanks, academia and other institutions.

### Length of leadership mandate

A renewable five-year term.

### Total quotas

\$360 billion, as of March 2013.

### Number of staff

Approximately 2,700.

### History of leadership

Leadership recruitment at the IMF and World Bank has dealt with the *nationality principle* – a longstanding convention by which the United States and Europe divide management of the respective organizations. The IMF's MD is selected by its executive board, which also approves the MD's contract. A governor or an executive director may nominate candidates without regard to their nationality, although all MDs have been European: Camille Gutt (from Belgium, 1946-1951); Ivar Rooth (Sweden, 1951-1956); Per Jacobsson (Sweden, 1956-1963); Pierre-Paul Schweitzer (France, 1963-1973); H. Johannes Witteveen (Netherlands, 1973-1978); Jacques de Larosière (France, 1978-1987); Michel Camdessus (France, 1987-2000); Horst Köhler (Germany, 2000-2004); Rodrigo de Rato (Spain, 2004-2007) and Dominique Strauss-Kahn (France, 2007-2011).

The IMF's current leader, Christine Lagarde (France, 2011-present), is also its first female MD.

The MD position has been accompanied by its share of controversy. In 2000, the United States challenged the German nomination of Caio Koch-Weser, thereby triggering conflict: Japan and developing countries signalled that the convention was to be called into question (lack of transparency and delays in appointment have been closely related to the convention). Later, in 2007, Rodrigo de Rato's resignation halfway through his term due to personal reasons shocked the organization. And his successor, Dominique Strauss-Kahn, resigned in May 2011 after being arrested.

### Current trajectory

It is widely recognized that, to be effective, the IMF governance structure must represent the interests of all its members and reflect the current world economy. This was seen in the 2006 reforms, which included wide-ranging quota realignments (increasing the voting power of dynamic emerging-market countries, consistent with their growing relative importance in the world economy), a significant increase in basic votes and a change in how they are determined, to protect the voting power of small and low-income countries.



	Indicators	Published rules	Other factors
I.	<b>The leadership selection process</b> searches and tests for specific, relevant competencies against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process		
1	Does the MO/IO publish the criteria/terms of reference for leadership online?	Yes. Terms of Appointment for Christine Lagarde were published on July 5, 2011 in form of a press release. <sup>148</sup> The Fund's Articles of Agreement and By-Laws offer standardized job description for Executive Directors. <sup>149</sup> There are also complete TORs for the ethics adviser, <sup>150</sup> the ombudsperson, <sup>151</sup> and the Independent Evaluation Office. <sup>152</sup>	Before 2007 there was no statement of the qualities, expertise and experience that candidates should have. The process improvements started with the Executive Board setting out a timetable and inviting nominations from Executive Directors for the post of MD, and interviewing those who applied. <sup>153</sup>
2	What percentage of the membership is involved in leadership selection and re-election in practice?	The entire membership. Any IMF member, through its Governor or Executive Director, can nominate a candidate for the post of Managing Director. According to the <i>quota formula</i> , "the total votes of each member shall be equal to the sum of its basic votes and its quota-based votes". <sup>154</sup> In December 2010, the Board of Governors approved a quota and governance reform that is to shift more than 6% of quota shares to emerging market and protect the quota shares and voting power of the poorest members. <sup>155</sup>	
3	Is there a time-bound, published, exhaustive process for leadership selection that weighs competence against the published criteria?	Yes. The process for leadership selection is part of the founding Articles of Agreement of the International Monetary Fund and is publicly available. <sup>156</sup> The procedures and timetable for 2011 selection of the Managing Director were published through a series of press releases. <sup>157</sup>	There is a nomination period, followed by shortlisting of candidates (in case there are more than three) by a majority of votes cast by the Executive Board. Once the shortlist is published 24 Executive Directors interview each candidate. The candidates then make statements to the Executive Board (which are published), following by a Q&A session. The Board then makes the final selection traditionally based on consensus (although a majority of votes cast is formally required). The selected candidate is notified and announced publicly, including the hiring contract.
	The leader has clear <b>performance expectations</b> which are transparent and consistent with MO/IO's overarching goals and which facilitates leadership accountability		
II.	1 Do the leaders set clear performance expectations for themselves, which are transparent and consistent?	Yes. The responsibilities of management of the organization are divided between the Managing Director and four Deputy Managing Directors (DMDs). Each DMD has a purview of countries and subject matters for which he/she is responsible and typically oversees the internal review process for each Board paper and chairs related Board meetings. In addition to the countries and subjects under his/her purview, the First Deputy Managing Director is responsible for all issues that are not in the purview of the other DMDs and assists the Managing Director in the comprehensive oversight of the institution. The Board also sets objectives for assessing the performance of the Managing Director (and DMDs), and such assessment takes place annually.	Commitments are sometimes made unofficially and before the selection is made. For example, Jacques de Larosière committed to chair the Board meetings personally, and he kept the promise. <sup>158</sup>

2	Is there an expectation that the leader translates overarching goals of organization into a manageable and clear strategy?	<p>Yes. Although it isn't in the terms of appointment. Managing Director presents their goals and vision to the institution's ministerial policy advisory committee, the IMFC, twice a year in the <i>Global Policy Agenda</i>.<sup>159</sup> IMFC discusses and provides its views, which are then translated by the Managing Director into an operationally pointed set of proposals as the <i>Statement on the Work Program</i> of the Executive Board, which is discussed and endorsed by the Executive Board.<sup>160</sup> <i>The Work Program</i> (twice a year) is then continuously monitored by the MD and the Board, and revised in light of developments to ensure its effective implementation. The Managing Director and the management team oversee the institution's <i>Accountability Framework</i> to ensure that senior managers (Department Heads) meet the strategic goals set by the Managing Director.</p>	<p>The regular structured discussions between department directors and management focus on key departmental objectives, including on budget and human resource priorities. Departmental objectives flow from the annual statement of <i>Management's Key Goals</i>, which is derived from the <i>Managing Director's Global Policy Agenda</i>. Management holds semi-annual discussions with each Director to discuss progress made with current strategic priorities and to review performance against budget and people management indicators. New goals and targets are also discussed for the period ahead. This process helps improve departmental alignment to institutional priorities and enhances collaboration between departments by specifying joint objectives, while promoting more effective management of budgets and people.<sup>161</sup></p>
3	Is the leader obliged to disclose conflicts of interest?	<p>Yes. Paragraph 27 of the <i>Code of Conduct</i><sup>162</sup> established the principle that "any staff member who considers that he or she might be in a position of actual or apparent conflict of interest should disclose the matter" to his or her supervisor or to the Compliance Officer. Submission of annual financial certification form is also part of MD's contract. The Code of Conduct is also considered in the assignment of staff tasks, including that a mission chief/reviewed cannot be assigned to a country of which he/she is a national. In addition, the <i>Ethics Committee of the Executive Board</i> deals with any possible conflicts of interest among Executive Directors.</p>	<p>According to the IEO, the Fund's governance framework is not well designed to identify actual and potential conflicts of interest or ethical problems of the MD.<sup>163</sup> Namely, there is no "whistle-blower" protection for persons who report misconduct, and, in particular, there is no mechanism for complaints and concerns about Executive Directors, the MD, and other senior officers that guarantees the confidentiality of the source.</p>
4	Is the leader obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics?	<p>Yes. The current MD is subject to the staff <i>Code of Conduct</i> under the terms of the letter of appointment. There is a Board Ethics Committee, which is separate from Ethics Officer.<sup>164</sup></p>	<p>As the IEO notes, it is not clear who would be in a position to apply this Code to the MD, given that those responsible for its application report to the MD.<sup>165</sup></p>

III. The leader has a defined <b>performance management</b> programme and receives annual feedback on performance	
1	<p>Is the leadership subjected to annual performance appraisal?</p> <p>Yes. The Executive Board conducts a direct <i>Annual Performance Review</i> of the Managing Director (and DMs), during which MD provides feedback on her own assessment and that of the Board in the same context.<sup>166</sup></p> <p>This annual exercise, introduced in 2009, is based on a defined framework. Each year, both the Board and the Managing Director specify performance objectives for each other, against which an assessment is conducted in the following year. In conducting this exercise, the Board each year appoints a working group of five Executive Directors (with geographical representation) to oversee the process. The process comprises several iterations and involves all Executive Directors.</p>
2	<p>Is remuneration or benefits tied to the outcomes of the performance management programme?</p> <p>Christine Lagarde's terms of appointment identify a fixed salary of \$467,940 per annum, which is adjusted by the increase in consumer price index in the greater Washington area.<sup>167</sup></p>
3	<p>Is the leader offered coaching and development opportunity to address weaknesses over time?</p> <p>Yes. IMF organizes managerial courses; the management team has access to them.</p>
IV. Leadership <b>re-election process</b> is based on transparent processes and metrics	
1	<p>Are performance management criteria considered by the full membership in the re-election process?</p> <p>Yes. The Executive Board, in consultation with the entire membership, determines whether to re-appoint the Managing Director. In doing so, it takes an account of MD's performance.</p>
2	<p>Are other qualified candidates considered in the re-election process?</p> <p>Yes. In considering any re-appointment of the Managing Director, the Executive Board, representing the membership, considers all options.</p>
	<p>According to IEO, the Board has thus far played only a pro forma role in selecting MDs and renewing their appointments, with the actual decision being made by a subset of member countries' authorities through an opaque process.<sup>168</sup></p> <p>According to IEO, there is no formal process for searching for candidates. The convention that the governments of their countries of origin propose candidates has in the past resulted in some competent possible candidates not being put forward for a variety of reasons including domestic political factors or lack of enthusiasm by the national authorities.<sup>169</sup></p>

V. The leader has the authority and mechanisms to <b>shift strategic priorities</b> to meet changing circumstances	
1	<p>Does the leader have the authority to shift strategic priorities in light of external changes?</p> <p>Yes. The Managing Director presents her <i>Global Policy Agenda</i>, outlining the strategic priorities of the institution, twice per year to the ministerial policy advisory committee, the IMFC, after close consultation with the Executive Board. Should circumstances warrant, the Managing Director can act quickly to consult with the Executive Board on refining the strategy in the interim period.</p>
2	<p>Does the MO/IO have processes that facilitate implementation of new strategic priorities?</p> <p>Yes. The Managing Director routinely consults with the Executive Board on all strategic matters. In addition, the Managing Director often meets with senior policy makers during her travel to member countries and discusses the strategic priorities of the institution, including emerging issues.<sup>170</sup></p>
3	<p>What percentage of resources are set aside for special initiatives decided by and controlled by a subset of the full membership?</p> <p>Supplementary financing arrangements exist between the IMF and a subset of members. Primary among these are the New Arrangements to Borrow between the IMF and 38 member countries. There is some discretionary budget on technical assistance: 40% (\$107 million, 46% of external financing over 1990-2012 period is Japanese) of IMF's budget developed and more than 70% of field delivery. Some funds are controlled by all membership, for example the <i>Poverty Reduction and Growth Facility</i> (PRGF).</p>
VI. The leader is expected to <b>attract, retain and develop talent</b> through-out the organization	
1	<p>Does the organization take staff surveys to assess staff satisfaction and performance and do leaders utilize the results of these surveys?</p> <p>Yes. There are periodic IMF-wide staff surveys on a wide range of issues, with the most recent conducted in 2013. The management team shares its results directly with all the staff (but does not publicly publish them).</p>
2	<p>Is the leader assessed on mentoring and coaching of subordinate staff?</p> <p>The management team is assessed on all issues. In the MD's self-assessment management of staff is an important element.<sup>172</sup></p>

VII.	<p><i>MO/IO has structures that encourage leadership to engage with diverse range of stakeholders</i></p> <p>The annual report mentions IMF cooperation with labour groups (mostly, though discussions), civil society organizations (through conferences, meetings, seminars and fellowship programme that could count as limited institutionalization), academia (academic fellowship programme), as well as legislators. The IMF Managing Director and the World Bank President also hold a civil society organizations town hall meeting during the Annual Meetings.</p>	<p>More recently, the IMF has increased its engagement with labour groups. Since 2010, collaboration between the IMF and the International Labour Organization (ILO) has noticeably increased, with greater focus on social protection floors, national social dialogue, and research on jobs and growth. The IMF engages with the ITUC on a regular basis, and the two organizations hold annual discussions with representatives of national labour unions. The IMF also regularly engages with global media and holds regular press briefings on country and policy matters.<sup>173</sup></p>
VIII.	<p><i>MO/IO has structures that engage the leader thoroughly with internal/external evaluations</i></p> <p>The <i>Independent Evaluation Office (IEO)</i> was established in 2001 to conduct objective evaluations of Fund policies and activities. Under its Terms of Reference, it is fully independent from the Management of the IMF and operates at arm's length from the Board of Executive Directors. It publishes one report a year on a specific IMF policy (role of IMF as trusted adviser, international reserves, research at the IMF). As indicated in the terms of reference for IEO,<sup>174</sup> it engages with executive management, the board and the staff when they "respond to relevant parts of the evaluation".<sup>175</sup></p> <p>From a more operational angle, the <i>Office of Internal Audit and Inspection</i> independently examines the effectiveness of the risk management, control, and governance processes of the organization. Each year, OIA conducts audits and reviews, which include financial audits, information technology audits, and operational and effectiveness audits. OIA may also provide consulting services, e.g., help identify controls for new processes. The overall purpose is to ensure that the IMF operates in line with best international practices. The IMF also conducts regular and extensive <i>internal self-assessments</i> of its work. There is a comprehensive internal review process for all IMF documents, policy analysis, and lending operations, which begins with an interdepartmental staff review. Management is responsible for the final clearance of all official documents before issuance to, and consideration by, the Executive Board. Thereafter, most documents are published. Examples of internal self-assessment include ex post assessments/evaluations of financial programmes (for example, a recent assessment of the Greece programme).<sup>176</sup></p>	

## f. International Organization for Migration (IOM)

### Organization

IOM works with partners to support states in meeting the growing operational challenges of migration governance; advance understanding of migration issues; encourage social and economic development through migration; and uphold the well-being and human rights of migrants.

IOM has a long-standing, extensive and closely coordinated working relationship with the UN, at policy and operational levels. At the operational level, IOM chiefs of mission participate in humanitarian country teams and in virtually all UN country teams. IOM contributes to system-wide operations through its participation in the Inter-Agency Standing Committee (IASC), and is an active partner, lead and co-lead in several clusters in many countries around the world.

At the global level, the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees and IOM are the camp coordination and camp management co-cluster lead agencies. At the policy level, IOM was chair of the Global Migration Group in the second semester of 2013, leading the group's preparations for the second UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development. From 2011 to 2013, the IOM director-general (DG) led system-wide efforts to support prevention of sexual exploitation and abuse (PSEA) as the PSEA champion. Inter-institutional cooperation is maintained by IOM's headquarters; the permanent observer in New York, through ongoing liaison with the UN secretariat; and special liaison missions in the field. Twenty-six UN agencies are represented in IOM as Observers.

### Governance

The IOM Council, comprising representatives of 157 member states, determines, examines and reviews policies, programmes and activities, and reviews and approves the organization's budget, expenditures and accounts. As the highest authority, the council reviews the reports, and approves and directs the activities, of its subsidiary bodies. Meeting regularly at its annual session and in special sessions, the council may admit non-member states upon their application. It may also admit international organizations and civil society organizations to participate in its sessions as non-voting observers. Preparations for council sessions are made through other governing body structures, including the standing committee on programmes and finance (SCPF), informal consultations and working groups.

### Length of leadership mandate

Five years; renewable once.

### Income

Reflecting IOM's expansion, the organization's budget reached \$1.3 billion in 2013, the fifth-consecutive year of growth.<sup>177</sup>

### Number of staff

Approximately 8,500 globally, with more than 480 field locations.<sup>178</sup>

### History of leadership

When selecting the DG, member states have traditionally elected the candidate nominated by IOM's largest donor country, with one exception: Bastiaan Haveman, Netherlands (1961-1969). IOM's leadership comprises a deputy director-general (DDG), who is also an elected official.

Past leaders of IOM and its predecessor organizations were: Hugh Gibson (from the United States, 1952-1954); Harold Tittman (United States, 1955-1958); Marcus Daly (United States, 1958-1961); Bastiaan Haveman (Netherlands, 1961-1969); John Thomas (United States, 1969-1979); James Carlin (United States, 1979-1988) and Brunson McKinley (United States, 1998-2008).

The current leader is William Swing (United States, 2008-present).<sup>179</sup>

### Current trajectory

After taking office, Swing embarked on a structural review that consolidated IOM's field structures and ensured greater coherence at headquarters;<sup>180</sup> increased the core funding;<sup>181</sup> and strengthened internal controls by establishing an audit and oversight committee.

Indicator	Published rules	Other factors
<b>I.</b>	<b>The leadership selection process</b> searches and tests for specific, relevant competencies against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process	
1 Does the IO publish the criteria/terms of reference for the leader online?	Yes. The IOM Constitution, which is available online, outlines the DG's functions. Accountable to the Council, the Director-General formulates proposals related to the administrative and executive functions of IOM, in accordance with the Constitution and Council policies and decisions.	
2 What percentage of the membership is involved in leadership selection and re-election of the leader?	Special Council Sessions invite all voting Member States to participate in the election process. The Director-General and the Deputy Director-General (DDG) are elected by a two-thirds majority of all participating voting Member States of the Council. <sup>182</sup> The Constitution outlines the criteria for Member States' loss of voting rights. A Member State which is in arrears in the payment of its financial contributions to the Organization loses its voting right if the amount of its arrears equals or exceeds the amount of the contributions due in the preceding two years.	
3 Is there a time-bound, published, exhaustive process for leadership selection that weighs competencies against the published criteria?	Yes. The process of DG and DDG selection is detailed in the Constitution, which is available online. Additional elements for the election of the leadership, adopted by the Council on 30 November 2007, stipulate the requirement that the nomination of candidates be presented by Member States to the Council Chairperson no later than two months prior to the elections.	
<b>II.</b>	<b>The leader has clear performance expectations</b> which are transparent and consistent with the IO's overarching goals and which facilitates leadership accountability	
1 Does the leader set clear performance expectations for themselves, which are transparent and consistent?	Yes. The Director-General's acceptance speech to the Council upon election outlines the overarching priorities for the mandate ahead. The Director-General reports biannually -- to the Council and to the SCPF -- on the performance of the organization under his leadership. The report specifies how the work of the Organization relates to each of the points of the IOM Strategy established by the Council.	
2 Is there an expectation that the leader translates overarching goals of the organization into a manageable and clear strategy?	Yes -- mandated by the Council, IOM has processes that establish action plans of the Organization's Strategy. The Regional Strategies are operational tools that illustrate how the global IOM Strategy (12-Point Strategy) is implemented at the regional level. Two coordinating committees for management coordination (MCC) and policy formulation (PFCC) facilitate coherence, communication and cooperation between Headquarters and the Field and enhance the quality of decision-making and compliance throughout the Organization. The Senior Management Team joins for a biennial retreat to review and operationalize multi-annual organizational goals with targets. In alternating years, the DG convenes a Global Chiefs of Mission meeting, where Field and HQ communicate and consult on key institutional priorities and challenges.	

3	Is the leader obliged to disclose conflicts of interest?	Yes, the DG, the DDG and all IOM staff are required to declare any conflicts of interest. The Constitution stipulates that in the performance of their duties, these shall neither seek nor receive instructions from an external authority. All employment by IOM is subject to signature of a declaration to this effect. The Ethics and Conduct Office provides advice on request for involvement in any activity outside IOM that may involve a conflict of interest.	
4	Is the leader obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics?	All employment in IOM is subject to a signed commitment to adhere to the IOM Standard of Conduct. All IOM staff members have an obligation to report any alleged violations to the Ethics and Conduct Office, who manages referrals concerning allegations of misconduct and unethical behaviour.	
<b>III. The leader has a defined performance management programme and receives annual feedback on performance</b>			
1	Is the leader subjected to annual performance appraisal?	The DG reports regularly to Member States and gives a full account of the organization's programmatic and financial performances in meetings of the Governing Bodies.	
2	Are remuneration or benefits tied to the outcomes of the performance management programme?	The DG's remuneration is determined by the Council, based on the UN pay scale and fixed for the entire duration of his mandate. <sup>183</sup>	
3	Is the leader offered coaching and development opportunity to address weaknesses over time?	Yes. IOM has a staff and development programme which provides coaching and development opportunities to the DG, DDG and other staff members.	
<b>IV. Re-election of the leader is based on transparent processes and metrics</b>			
1	Are performance management criteria considered by the full membership in the re-election process?	The performance is subject to the criteria established by each of the voting countries individually. Re-election, like the initial election, is determined by Member States through an election process.	
2	Are other qualified candidates considered in the re-election process?	Yes. Following the process, all nominated candidates are considered.	
<b>V. The leader has the authority and mechanisms to shift strategic priorities to meet changing circumstances</b>			
1	Does the leader have the authority to shift strategic priorities in light of external changes?	Yes. The Director-General puts into action, varying the emphasis as appropriate to circumstances, the IOM Strategy established by Member States. Moreover, the IOM Constitution requests the DG to 'formulate proposals for appropriate action by the Council', proposals that have included new strategic imperatives. <sup>184</sup>	
2	Does the IO have processes that facilitate implementation of new strategic priorities?	Yes, the DG implements new strategic priorities in consultation within IOM, the Organization's Member States as well as relevant partners.	



3	What percentage of resources are set aside for special initiatives decided and controlled by a subset of the full membership?	3% of IOM's annual budget comes from assessed contributions and is used to cover the core structure. The operational part of the budget (97%) is provided by Member States and other donors for specific projects that fall under IOM's mandate and strategy – both of which are established through a unanimous decision of the Member States. <sup>185</sup> IOM also manages special funds whose criteria and procedures are established by the full membership. These funds allow swift responses to emergencies while waiting for funding to be cleared (Migration Emergency Funding Mechanism) or to assist vulnerable migrants who would not be eligible under other funding mechanisms (Global Assistance Fund for Victims of Trafficking). In addition, the IOM Development Fund seeds innovative pilot projects.	Some respondents have noted that this funding structure influences IOM's activities. <sup>186</sup> For instance one UK DFID report, noted that as IOM is a 'projectised organisation' the UK 'only seek[s] to influence [it] on a project basis'. <sup>187</sup>	
VI.	<b>The leader is expected to attract, retain and develop talent</b> through-out the organization			
1	Does the organization take staff surveys to assess staff satisfaction and performance and do leaders utilize the results of these surveys?	Yes. IOM has carried out a number of surveys, most notably the "Global Staff Satisfaction Survey". It is also carrying out a review of its organizational restructuring which includes surveys to staff members. IOM also uses organization-wide an online staff evaluation survey, as one of DG's priorities will continue to be "staff professionalism". In addition, IOM has a small team focusing on talent management in the organization. The leadership holds regular consultations with the Staff Association Committee.		
2	Is the leader assessed on mentoring and coaching of subordinate staff?	The DG sets priorities for coaching of staff. He has been involved with the training of new Chiefs of Mission by articulating IOM's vision and holds regular open dialogues with staff. <sup>188</sup>		
VII.	<i>The IO has structures that encourage leadership to engage with diverse range of stakeholders</i>			
	Yes. One of DG Swing's priorities revolves around the theme of "partnerships". IOM is a permanent observer to the UN and a standing invitee to IASC meetings. The Organization is a member of the Global Migration Group, the principal inter-agency coordination mechanism on migration, and works closely with the Global Forum for Migration and Development (GFMD), including through support to the Group's Secretariat and the Forum's Support Unit. IOM holds regular consultations with partner NGOs and hosts an annual global civil society consultation in HQ. The Organization provides substantive and logistical support to regional cooperation mechanisms on migration involving a broad range of state and non-state stakeholders. In recent years, the Organization has placed greater emphasis on outreach to the private sector.			
VIII.	<i>The IO has structures that engage the leadership thoroughly with internal/external evaluations</i>			
	Yes, both external and internal. IOM's Office of the Inspector General contributes to the oversight of the Organization, through its functions of internal audit, evaluation, rapid assessment and investigation. An external auditor, reporting to the membership, carries out performance audits and examines the annual financial statements of IOM, in relation to accepted international auditing standard. In addition to that, an Audit and Oversight Advisory Committee (AOAC), established to increase the transparency and accountability of IOM, is composed of five members selected by Member States that report annually to the SCPF. Finally, external evaluations conducted on the request of donors are listed on the website and available upon request. <sup>189</sup>			

## e. United Nations Development Programme (UNDP)

### Organization

As the UN's largest and lead development actor, the UNDP's mission is to assist countries to "achieve sustainable human development". Its four core areas are: the millennium development goals and poverty reduction; democratic governance; environment and energy; and crisis prevention and recovery.<sup>190</sup>

### Governance

The UNDP has an executive board of 36 states, which serve on a rotating basis under the authority of the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC).<sup>191</sup> The board is responsible for providing policy guidance, monitoring performance and deciding on administrative and financial plans.<sup>192</sup> Since 2001, the board has held two regular sessions and an annual session each year.

### Length of leadership mandate

Four years; can be renewed twice.

### Income

The UNDP's income from all contributions was \$4.64 billion in 2012.<sup>193</sup>

### Number of staff

8,000.<sup>194</sup>

### History of leadership

The UNDP administrator was traditionally an American, nominated by the US government and recommended by the UN secretary-general (SG) to the General Assembly. This changed in 1999, when Mark Malloch Brown (United Kingdom) became administrator. The subsequent administrator was from Turkey, and the current one is from New Zealand.

Past leaders of the UNDP were: Paul Hoffman (from the United States, 1966-1972); Rudolph Peterson (United States, 1972-1976); Frank Morse (United States, 1976-1986); William Draper (United States, 1986-1993); James Gus Speth (United States, 1993-1999); George Malloch Brown (United Kingdom, 1999-2005) and Kemal Dervis (Turkey, 2005-2009).

The current leader is Helen Clark (New Zealand, 2009-present).

### Current trajectory

In April 2011, Clark launched an "agenda for organizational change",<sup>195</sup> seeking to enhance organizational effectiveness by improving UNDP's strategic planning and organizational performance. Clark introduced the annual business plan in 2012, where organizational goals "cascaded" to unit work plans in order to strengthen alignment of actions and resources.<sup>196</sup> The UNDP was ranked in the top 10 of 72 organizations in the 2012 Aid Transparency Index.<sup>197</sup>

Clark was re-elected in April 2013 for a second four-year term, and in 2014 she launched a series of human resource reforms. These included reducing staff at headquarters and regional levels by 10%; reversing the staff distribution ratio so that 60% of employees would be based at regional and country offices, and 40% at the New York headquarters; and integrating policy and support-programme efforts into a single bureau to reduce staffing costs.<sup>198</sup>

	Indicators	Published rules	Other factors
I.	<b>The leadership selection process</b> searches and tests for specific, relevant competencies against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process		
1	Does the IO publish the criteria/terms of reference for the leader online?	There are no publicly accessible terms of reference online for the leadership. <sup>199</sup> UNDP's founding General Assembly resolutions do not outline the Administrator's functions.	
2	What percentage of the membership is involved in leadership election and re-election in practice?	The Administrator is officially appointed by the UN Secretary General (SG), in collaboration with the Executive Board, and then confirmed by the General Assembly for a term of four years. <sup>200</sup> Officially all member states of the General Assembly have a say.	However, until 1999 the US President proposed the UNDP Administrator, whom the SG then recommended to the General Assembly for confirmation. <sup>201</sup> Kofi Annan introduced a new, more merit-based and open selection process. <sup>202</sup> The largest donor states have tended to have the most influence on the SG's decision.
3	Is there a time-bound, published, exhaustive process for election of the leader that weighs competence against the published criteria?	There is no formalized process officially documented.	Annan's new selection process introduced: formation of specialist search selection committees who conducted research and interviews and recommended a candidate to the SG. <sup>203</sup> This candidate could be vetoed by the SG and had to gain General Assembly approval. However the SG's selection committees were not formalized and there are no formal documents outlining this process. <sup>204</sup> Furthermore the selection process is still politicized: candidates must be recommended by a government and governments can veto the decision.
II	<b>The leader has clear performance expectations</b> which are transparent and consistent with IO's overarching goals and which facilitates leadership accountability		
1	Does the leader set clear performance expectations for themselves, which are transparent and consistent?	UNDP publishes the Administrator's Annual Report which outlines the organization's performance to the Executive Board. However there are no separate, individual performance standards for the Administrator. <sup>205</sup>	The Annual Report is reportedly widely read by all staff to know the Administrator's priorities. <sup>206</sup>
2	Is there an expectation that the leader translates overarching goals of the organization into a manageable and clear strategy?	UNDP has set specific, measurable strategic priorities in Strategic Plans such as the current 2014 – 2017 Strategic Plan. <sup>207</sup> UNDP has also explained how their strategic goals will be implemented and measured in detail. <sup>208</sup>	

3	Is the leader obliged to disclose conflicts of interest?	All senior officers in the UN system must file a financial disclosure statement annually with the UN ethics office. <sup>209</sup> Current Administrator Helen Clark has disclosed her financial assets publicly. <sup>210</sup>	
4	Is the leader obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics?	All UN staff, including the Administrator, are obliged to follow the UN Code of Conduct. <sup>211</sup>	
<b>III. The leader has a defined performance management programme and receives annual feedback on performance</b>			
1	Is the leader subjected to an annual performance appraisal?	UNDP's Administrator is accountable to the UNDP Executive Board.	We found no evidence (formal or informal) of an individual performance management programme or appraisal for the Administrator.
2	Is remuneration or benefits tied to the outcomes of the performance management programme?	The UN Human Resources rules and regulations on remuneration sets a clear, fixed pay scale for all staff depending on their rank. The Administrator is paid at the Under Secretary General pay grade. <sup>212</sup>	
3	Is the leader offered coaching and development opportunities to address weaknesses over time?	UNDP has an extensive programme for leadership development and management skills which over 600 staff participated in 2012. <sup>213</sup> Senior leadership can attend Executive Education Programmes.	
<b>IV. Leadership re-election process is based on transparent processes and metrics</b>			
1	Are performance management criteria considered by the full membership in the re-election process?	There is no documentation of a formal performance appraisal of the candidate.	All Administrators who have sought a second term have been reappointed by the UNSG, with the Board's approval. Interviewees claimed that there are informal discussions between the SG, key donors, other political groups such as the G7 and regional groups over the Administrator's performance but no formalized appraisal process. <sup>214</sup>
2	Are other qualified candidates considered in the re-appointment process?	No official evidence of this.	
<b>V. The leader has the authority and mechanisms to shift strategic priorities to meet changing circumstances</b>			
1	Does the leader have the authority to shift strategic priorities in light of external changes?	The Administrator operates under the policy guidance of the Executive Board. <sup>215</sup> The Administrator can pursue new initiatives but must get the Executive Board's approval. <sup>216</sup>	The Administrator may influence Board decisions and does not always have gain formal approval through a majority vote to begin work in new areas. <sup>217</sup>
2	Does the IO have processes that facilitate implementation of new strategic priorities?	UNDP has a senior management committee which discusses new priorities and will evaluate all documents before they go to the Executive Committee with requested actions. <sup>218</sup>	

3	What percentage of resources are set aside for special initiatives decided by and controlled by a subset of the full membership?	In 2012, earmarked contributions from bilateral (\$1.33 billion) and multilateral partners (\$1.53 billion) accounted for 22% of the overall income. <sup>219</sup> UNDP's core resources are disbursed by the General Assembly and have stagnated in recent years: in 2012 they were 20% of its overall financing. <sup>220</sup>	UNDP is reported to 'actively' pursue 'non-core financing by presenting donors with programmes that appeal to them'. <sup>221</sup> UNDP has also diversified its sources of financing in recent years with financing from: other multilateral sources (such as the European Commission and the Global Environment Fund) and private financing (which constitutes almost a third of the budget). It has gained financing from emerging countries who pay directly for services provided by UNDP.
VI.	<b>The leader is expected to attract, retain and develop talent through-out the organization</b>		
1	Does the organization take staff surveys to assess staff satisfaction and performance and do leaders utilize the results of these surveys?	UNDP conducts annual Global Staff Surveys which are carried out by an external, independent organization. In addition, UNDP has prioritized supporting staff in its 2014 – 2017 Strategic Plan which states that "UNDP will lift its people management capabilities with speedier recruitment and initiation programmes that support staff to become effective more quickly, ensure diversity, manage talent and deliver better succession planning for key posts." <sup>222</sup>	
2	Is executive management assessed on mentoring and coaching of subordinate staff?	They are not formally expected to do this.	
VII.	<b>The IO has structures that encourage leadership to engage with diverse range of stakeholders</b>		
		UNDP is manager of the UN Resident Coordinator System. In this role it has to coordinate and facilitate programming and common 'business operations' of other UN agencies at country level. They have proposed evaluating their partnerships with partners' satisfaction surveys with UNDP. <sup>223</sup>	
VIII.	<b>The IO has structures that engage leadership thoroughly with internal/external evaluations</b>		
		UNDP revised its evaluation policy in 2011 to establish the Evaluation Office's independence and ensure that all evaluations have a management response. <sup>224</sup> The head of the UNDP Evaluation Office reports directly to the Executive Board. The Administrator is briefed before and their office prepares a management response to evaluations. The Administrator has the right of reply to evaluations and discusses follow-up actions with the Board.	

## h. United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR)

### Organization

UNHCR's core mandate is the protection of refugees. In recent years, the agency has also taken a role in humanitarian crises and situations involving internally displaced persons (IDPs).<sup>225</sup>

### Governance

UNHCR is a subsidiary body of the UN General Assembly, established under Article 22 of the UN charter. The high commissioner (HC) acts under the authority of and reports annually to the General Assembly. The UNHCR statute authorizes the General Assembly and the Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to give the office policy guidance.<sup>226</sup> However, UNHCR's principal executive and advisory body is the Executive Committee of the Programme of the UNHCR (ExCom), comprised of 87 member states as of July 2013.<sup>227</sup> ExCom is responsible for approving UNHCR's budget and programme, and providing guidance on the agency's management and priorities.<sup>228</sup>

### Length of leadership mandate

No time limit has been stated; in the past, HCs have served up to three terms. A term is commonly five years (e.g. Sadruddin Aga Khan was HC for 12 years).

### Income

UNHCR's annual budget is needs-based, and in 2012 was \$4.3 billion (including supplementary programmes).<sup>229</sup> However, its income is typically far below the budget: in 2012, it received only about \$2.3 billion in voluntary funding.<sup>230</sup>

### Number of staff

Over 6,800, with more than 150 nationalities working at 259 offices in 118 countries.<sup>231</sup>

### History of leadership

The past leaders of UNHCR were: Gerrit Jan van Heuven Goedhart (from the Netherlands, 1951-1956); Auguste Lindt (Switzerland, 1956-1960); Félix Schnyder (Switzerland, 1960-1965); Sadruddin Aga Khan (Iran, 1965-1977); Poul Hartling (Denmark, 1978-1985); Jean-Pierre Hocké (Switzerland, 1986-1989); Thorvald Stoltenberg (Norway, 1990-1990); Sadako Ogata (Japan, 1990-2000) and Ruud Lubbers (Netherlands, 2001-2005)

The current HC is António Guterres (Portugal, 2005-present).

UNHCR has had several high-profile leadership scandals. Jean-Pierre Hocké (1986-1989) had to resign as HC after he and his wife flew first class while donors were demanding greater budget restrictions for the agency.<sup>232</sup> HC Rudd Lubbers (2001-2005) also damaged UNHCR's reputation when he was forced to resign in 2005 due to allegations of sexual abuse.<sup>233</sup> United Nations SG Javier Perez de Cuéllar nominated Virendra Dayal, the chief of his own executive office and who had previously worked at UNHCR. The United States and other major donors expressed concern, arguing there was insufficient consultation, and the SG withdrew Dayal's nomination.<sup>234</sup>

### Current trajectory

Under Guterres' leadership, UNHCR has made progress on internal reforms.<sup>235</sup> The HC office has introduced results-based management, a new IT system and an ethics office. In 2012, the HC appointed an independent audit and oversight committee to review and strengthen these functions.<sup>236</sup> UNHCR has also restructured and reduced staff costs from 41% of total expenditure in 2006 to 26% at the beginning of 2013.<sup>237</sup> Guterres has sought a greater role in protecting IDPs and people displaced by natural disasters. However, some donors are concerned that UNHCR is expanding beyond its mandate and not prioritizing protection of refugees.<sup>238</sup>

Towards the end of 2012, UNHCR established an organization-wide risk management framework. In this phase, the work on enterprise risk management (ERM) concentrated on developing a draft policy framework and implementation tools, which have been tested at headquarters and in four field operations throughout 2013. A chief risk officer reports directly to the deputy HC. Global implementation of ERM will continue throughout 2014.<sup>239</sup>

Indicators	Published rules	Other factors <sup>240</sup>
I.	The <b>leadership selection process</b> searches and tests for specific, relevant competencies against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process	
1 Does the IO publish the criteria/terms of reference for the leader online?	The core functions of the HC (HC) are outlined in UNHCR's Statute, as effectively revised and extended through successive GA resolutions. <sup>241</sup> The UN Secretary General proposes the terms of appointment which are then by approved by the General Assembly. <sup>242</sup> The HC's functions are also described in UNHCR's manual (chapter II) which is available on the Intranet and accessible to permanent missions and UNHCR's partners. <sup>243</sup>	The HC has often come from a significant donor state (the current HC is an exception to this). Meanwhile, the post of Deputy HC has almost always been a US National. <sup>246</sup> Powerful donor states have a strong influence on the decision and have frequently vetoed potential candidates. <sup>247</sup> There has only been one contested election for the HC, which was in 1950 for the first HC. <sup>248</sup>
2 What percentage of the membership is involved in election and re-election of the leader in practice?	According to UNHCR's Statute, the HC is elected by the UN General Assembly on the recommendation of the UN Secretary General. <sup>244</sup> The Secretary General consults the five geographical groups of the General Assembly and members of the Security Council. <sup>245</sup>	The Guterres election was reportedly more transparent than previous as it 'involved some prior public scrutiny of the candidates' <sup>249</sup> ; donors still had a large input. <sup>250</sup>
3 Is there a time-bound, published, exhaustive process for selection of the leader that weighs competence against the published criteria?	No. The selection process is largely a process of consultations between the UN SG and key donor states.	
II.	<b>performance expectations</b> which are transparent and consistent with the IO's overarching goals and which facilitates accountability	
1 Does the leader set clear performance expectations for themselves, which are transparent and consistent?	The HC sets out his/her objectives in a number of UNHCR reports, including the annual Global Reports and the Global Strategic Priorities. <sup>251</sup> These are organization-wide goals, not specific to the HC.	
2 Is there an expectation that the leader translates overarching goals of organization into a manageable and clear strategy?	In addition to the Global Strategic Priorities, UNHCR has established a Global Management Accountability Framework (GMAF). The GMAF reportedly 'comprehensively maps accountabilities, responsibilities and authorities across the organization and relates them to the corresponding management policies and guidance'. <sup>252</sup>	
3 Is the leader obliged to disclose conflicts of interest?	All senior officers in the UN system must file a financial disclosure statement annually with the UN ethics office. <sup>253</sup> Guterres has voluntarily disclosed this publicly. <sup>254</sup>	
4 Is the leader obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics?	All UNHCR staff including the senior management are asked to sign the UNHCR Code of Conduct. <sup>255</sup>	Staff may decide not to sign the code of conduct, in which case they are obliged to explain their decision in writing. <sup>256</sup>

III. The leader has a defined performance management programme and receives annual feedback on performance		
1	Is the leader subjected to annual performance appraisal?	There is no formal performance management appraisal for the HC. However, the HC reports annually to the Executive Committee and to the Third Committee of the General Assembly, and in UNHCR's annual reports. <sup>257</sup> The Deputy HC and the Assistant HCs have performance appraisals. <sup>258</sup>
2	Is remuneration or benefits tied to the outcomes of the performance management programme?	The HC has a fixed salary and standard entitlements like any other UN staff member. When on mission, he receives a standard travel allowance like all other UN staff. <sup>260</sup> The UN Human Resources rules and regulations on remuneration govern the HC's salary. <sup>261</sup>
3	Is the leader offered coaching and development opportunity to address weaknesses over time?	There is no formal or standard training programme or coaching for the HC. The Chef du Cabinet provides informal on the job training in UN rules and protocols to new HCs. <sup>262</sup> UNHCR has established a Global Learning Centre (GLC) in Budapest to consolidate its learning activities and programmes. It has a position dedicated to developing and delivering training programmes for senior management but this does not include the HC, Deputy or Assistant HCs. <sup>263</sup>
IV. Leadership re-election is based on transparent processes and metrics		
1	Are performance management criteria considered by the full membership in the re-election process?	If member states are content with the work of the HC, the SG will nominate him/her for re-election by the General Assembly. <sup>264</sup> There is no formal appraisal process.
2	Are other qualified candidates considered in the re-election process?	Traditionally the HC is re-elected by the GA if s/he stands. There is no stated time limit; the HC can stand for a third mandate.
V. The leader has the authority and mechanisms to shift strategic priorities to meet changing circumstances		
1	Does the leader have the authority to shift strategic priorities in light of external changes?	The UNHCR Statute states that the HC shall follow 'policy directives' from the General Assembly or ECOSOC, and that the office may engage in 'such additional activities' as the General Assembly may determine. <sup>266</sup>
		The office was created with a high degree of autonomy and although the UNSG signs the contract appointing the HC, the UNSG does not have a role in performance management. <sup>259</sup>
		However, they can ask for this additional training if needed.
		The General Assembly rarely goes to a full vote as the HC is normally reappointed by consensus. <sup>265</sup> Other nominees will be put forward only if there is not a consensus.
		The HC can accept, influence and generate policy directives in the General Assembly, ECOSOC and ExCom. <sup>267</sup> The HC sets UNHCR strategic priorities in consultation with senior management, field operations, persons of concern, partners and member states. These priorities have evolved, as reflected in the Strategic Review, for instance UNHCR has developed an 'age, gender and diversity' approach and focused increased attention on sexual and gender based violence in operations and on LGBTI persons of concern. <sup>268</sup>



2	Does the IO have processes that facilitate implementation of new strategic priorities?	UNHCR has a number of mechanisms, including: its global needs assessment (which identifies its needs-based annual budget, based upon consultation with persons of concern and partners), the Global Strategic Priorities, EXCOM conclusions, the annual HC's Dialogues on Protection Challenges. <sup>269</sup>	UNHCR has tasked the Deputy HC with following-up on recommendations that come out of the staff survey. <sup>272</sup> According to Turk and Eyster (2010), responses from the survey have guided Human Resources reform and resulted in changes to UNHCR's postings and promotions procedures. <sup>273</sup>
3	What percentage of resources are set aside for special initiatives decided by and controlled by a subset of the full membership?	UNHCR is almost completely voluntarily funded and has a very small UN regular budget. <sup>270</sup> In 2012, 98% of funding was voluntary and only 2% came from UN Regular Budget (assessed contributions) to cover administrative costs. <sup>271</sup> ExCom must approve UNHCR's budget, and even supplementary appeals which are issued during the year.	
VI.	The leader is expected to <b>attract, retain and develop talent</b> through-out the organization		
1	Does the organization take staff surveys to assess staff satisfaction and performance and do leaders utilize the results of these surveys?	UNHCR conducts Global Staff Surveys regularly. These were first administered in 2006 and have become a regular biannual exercise.	
2	Is the leader assessed on mentoring and coaching of subordinate staff?	The HC is not assessed formally on the mentoring or coaching of subordinates. However, the role means s/he informally mentors his/her team of senior managers (20 bureau heads and directors who meet weekly as well as the 'troika' of the Deputy HC and the Assistant HCs). <sup>274</sup>	
VII.	The IO has structures that <b>encourage leadership to engage with diverse range of stakeholders</b>		
		The HC meets regularly with the Executive Committee. S/he has also established informal dialogues with donors who give more than \$20million, Regional Groups and refugee hosting countries. In addition, the HC holds: an annual meeting with NGOs, regular high-level bilateral meetings with key humanitarian agencies, and a dialogue on Protection Challenges. UNHCR includes persons of concern and partners in their planning and priority setting.	
VIII.	The IO has structures that <b>engage leadership thoroughly with internal/external evaluations</b>		
		The <i>Policy Development and Evaluation Section</i> is part of UNHCR's Executive Direction and Management Division and reports directly to the HC. There are a number of other oversight functions which engage senior management with evaluations and findings of other oversight mechanism.	



## i. World Bank Group (WBG)

### Organization

The WBG consists of five institutions: International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (IBRD),<sup>275</sup> International Development Association (IDA),<sup>276</sup> International Finance Corporation (IFC),<sup>277</sup> Multilateral Investment Guarantee Agency (MIGA),<sup>278</sup> and International Centre for Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID).<sup>279</sup> The WBG is headquartered in Washington DC and has more than 124 country offices.

### Governance

Many of the bank's institutional features resemble those of the IMF. Member countries (188) govern the WBG through the board of governors and board of executive directors.<sup>280</sup> The 25 resident executive directors (EDs) are responsible for the conduct of the bank's general operations under delegated powers from the board of governors.

Five EDs are appointed by those member states with the largest shares (France, Germany, Japan, United Kingdom and United States). The remaining 25 EDs are elected every 2 years by constituencies made up of the remaining members. Saudi Arabia, China and the Russian Federation, however, are single-member chairs, meaning that they exercise their votes alone rather than doing so in constituencies of multiple member states. The EDs select the president. Jim Yong Kim is the WBG's 12th president and is chairman of the board of EDs (elected in 2012).

### Length of leadership mandate

Five years; can be renewed twice.

### Income

The board of EDs approved approximately \$31.55 billion in financial assistance in fiscal year 2013, with \$40.84 billion predicted for 2014.<sup>281</sup> The 2013 total comprised \$15.2 billion in IBRD lending and \$16.3 billion in IDA support, with an administrative budget of approximately \$1.9 billion for fiscal year 2014.<sup>282</sup> In 2012, Jim Yong Kim, the new president, announced a three-year plan to decrease the bank's budget by 8%, or \$400 million.<sup>283</sup>

### Number of staff

Over 9,000 employees from more than 168 countries.<sup>284</sup>

### History of leadership

An unwritten rule exists that the US president selects the WBG president.<sup>285</sup> Up until 2011, the choice of an American as president of the WBG was not openly challenged by the proposal of a competing candidate. In that year, however, two non-US candidates – Jose Antonio Ocampo (Colombia) and Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (Nigeria) – were put forward.<sup>286</sup> Jim Yong Kim, an American, won the nomination.

The following were past presidents of the bank: Eugene Meyer (1946-1946), John J. McCloy (1947-1949), Eugene R. Black, Sr. (1949-1963), George Woods (1963-1968), Robert McNamara (1968-1981), Alden W. Clausen (1981-1986), Barber Conable (1986-1991), Lewis T. Preston (1991-1995), James Wolfensohn (1995-2005), Paul Wolfowitz (2005-2007) and Robert Zoellick (2007-2012).

Appointed president in 2012, Kim proposed a number of institutional changes in 2013 after a survey of approximately 10,000 employees revealed a “culture of fear”, “fear of risk” and a “terrible” environment for collaboration.<sup>287</sup> Kim's changes have, however, been met with criticism. The decision to alter the bank's organization, for example, has been deemed unnecessary.<sup>288</sup> Hiring the management consulting firm McKinsey & Company for the restructuring was also controversial, given that the firm had designed the existing structure (and all previous structures since the bank's 1972 reorganization under President McNamara)<sup>289</sup>, and had competed directly with the World Bank in advising governments.<sup>290</sup>

### Current trajectory

The World Bank's organizational reforms come at a time of increasing competition from other multilateral development institutions. A study by Humphrey and Michaelowa (2013), for example, found that, under certain macroeconomic circumstances, individual borrowers in Latin America often prefer to work with the IADB and CAF due to their faster processing times and less bureaucratic social and economic lending requirements.<sup>291</sup> Furthermore, numerous observers see the New Development Bank, composed of Brazil, the Russia Federation, India, China and South Africa (BRICS), as a potential competitor to the World Bank and the IMF.<sup>292</sup>

	Indicator	Published rules	Other factors
I.	<b>The leadership selection process</b> searches and tests for specific, relevant competencies against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process		
1	Does the MO/O publish the criteria/terms of reference for leadership online?	Yes. Terms of appointments were recently made publicly available, although Bob Zoellick's contract is easier to find than Dr Kim's. <sup>293</sup>	The forced resignation of World Bank President Paul Wolfowitz in 2007 for violating contractual clauses relating to ethical and governing principles indicates that the terms of reference for leadership selection are taken seriously and are enforceable. <sup>294</sup>
2	What percentage of the membership is involved in leadership selection and re-election in practice?	All member states vote during elections and re-elections either alone (as in the case of Saudi Arabia, Russia and China) or via their constituency representative.	In practice, members approve the candidate put forth by the United States. <sup>295</sup>
3	Is there a time-bound, published, exhaustive process for leadership selection that weighs competence against the published criteria?	Yes. Each of the World Bank Group organizations operates according to procedures established by its Articles of Agreement, which include terms of services for the President. <sup>296</sup>	
II.	<b>The leader has clear performance expectations</b> which are transparent and consistent with MO/O's overarching goals and which facilitates leadership accountability		
1	Do the leaders set clear performance expectations for themselves, which are transparent and consistent?	There is no procedure for that. Some set personal standards during inaugural speeches or pronouncements at the Board meetings (see the minutes). <sup>297</sup>	Leaders focus on broad strategic points, but there is no set of commitments. <sup>298</sup> Robert McNamara and George Woods are thought to be most clear on their performance objectives. <sup>299</sup>
2	Is there an expectation that the leader translates overarching goals of organization into a manageable and clear strategy?	Only through subsection and strategic reports. Important to note that expectations come from a very diverse group of stakeholders (see WBG Strategy for 2030 approved in April 2013). <sup>300</sup>	The debate is also about defining expectations (different at different times) and what leadership does to understand why results don't meet them. <sup>301</sup>
3	Is the leader obliged to disclose conflicts of interest?	Yes. All the mid-level employees have to disclose financial investments, including the President. A separate Code of Conduct for Board Officials sets the same standard. <sup>302</sup>	In practice, the Bank's compliance with the disclosure principle was proven on the Wolfowitz's case in 2007. The World Bank Board lost confidence in the President Wolfowitz after a special investigative committee found he had violated his contract by breaking ethical and governing rules in arranging a promotion package for his partner Shaha Ali Raza. Wolfowitz resigned before his term had ended. <sup>303</sup>
4	Is the leader obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics?	Yes. Code of ethics equally applies to every staff member. There is an Office of Ethics and Business Conduct, an ethics helpline, a Code of Conduct for Staff (created in 2003), as well as a Code of Conduct for Board Officials. It has been recently refined to include, for example, sexual harassment (due to accession of women at the WBG). <sup>304</sup>	

III. The leader has a defined <b>performance management</b> programme and receives annual feedback on performance	
1	<p>Is the leadership subjected to annual performance appraisal?</p> <p>Yes, but not to the same extent as the regular staff. The evaluation of the organization and the President are one and the same if the President is held responsible for its performance. <i>Internal Evaluation Group</i> (IEG) "Evaluation of the World Bank's Organizational Effectiveness"<sup>305</sup> report published in April 2012 included aspects of leadership.</p>
2	<p>Is remuneration or benefits tied to the outcomes of the performance management programme?</p> <p>No, variation is very limited. Salaries for top management are disclosed in annual reports.<sup>307</sup></p>
3	<p>Is the leader offered coaching and development opportunities to address weaknesses over time?</p> <p>Only on an ad-hoc basis.</p>
IV. Leadership <b>re-election</b> is based on transparent processes and metrics	
1	<p>Are performance management criteria considered by the full membership in the re-election process?</p> <p>No evidence.</p>
2	<p>Are other qualified candidates considered in the re-election process?</p> <p>Yes.</p>
V. The leader has the authority and mechanisms to <b>shift strategic priorities</b> to meet changing circumstances	
1	<p>Does the leader have the authority to shift strategic priorities in light of external changes?</p> <p>Yes, the President can recommend shifts of strategy thorough delivering reports for the Development Committee.<sup>311</sup> The governors approve the proposals.</p>
2	<p>Does the MO/IO have processes that facilitate implementation of new strategic priorities?</p> <p>Unclear. Among mechanisms that partly facilitate implementation of new strategies: reports of the Development Committee; agenda and summaries of meetings; Appraisal reports (Internal Completion Reports (ICR); Project Completion Reports (PCR) etc.); Internal Evaluation Group (IEG) reports (the unit reports to the Board of Governors, not management of the Bank); International Development Association (IDA) reports.</p>

3	What percentage of resources are set aside for special initiatives decided by and controlled by a subset of the full membership?	There is a rapid growth in “trust funds”, non-discretionary budget that is being earmarked. <sup>313</sup> Ideally, trust funds would be closely linked to the World Bank’s strategy, processes and oversight. However, since trust funds add 25% to the Bank’s administrative budget, the incentives to align are weak. In addition, the biggest contributors in 2012 are US and UK (\$4.5bn, more than one third of total), which increases risk of capture by these two countries.	Trust funds influence behaviours and priorities; donors want this. It also distracts other resources (not only financial, but also human resources, for example). Also consider Reimbursable Advisory Services – when countries ask for extra services (management, for example, RAMP programme where for a fee the World Bank undertakes management of assets). <sup>314</sup>
VI. The leader is expected to <b>attract, retain and develop talent</b> through-out the organization			
1	Does the organization take staff surveys to assess staff satisfaction and performance and do leaders utilize the results of these surveys?	Yes. There are: (1) broad staff surveys conducted every 18 months to reveal staff satisfaction with managers, (2) “360 degrees” exercise where one solicits inputs of subordinates and (3) a mechanism of peer review in place to make recommendations for correction. Jim Yong Kim recently conducted a survey of its 10,000 employees. It revealed a “culture of fear,” pervasive “fear of risk” and a “terrible” environment for collaboration. <sup>315</sup>	Staff surveys have been playing a surprisingly large role since Kim came. <sup>316</sup>
2	Is executive management assessed on mentoring and coaching of subordinate staff?	No evidence.	It is “not a priority question”. <sup>317</sup>

VII.	<p><i>MO/IO has structures that encourage leadership to engage with diverse range of stakeholders</i></p> <p>Within its Social Development Department, the Participation and Civic Engagement Group promotes the participation of people and their organizations to influence institutions, policies and processes for equitable and sustainable development. The group assists World Bank units, client governments and civil society organizations. A Civil Society Policy Forum, organized jointly with the World Bank, in parallel with the Annual and Spring Meetings of the IMF and World Bank that covers a wide range of topics, including many suggested by CSOs themselves. CSO consultations are now common practice (if not required) as part of project appraisal processes, notification of procurement bids, and part of the WDR process (publishing early concept notes and initial drafts for public comments).</p> <p>There are also structures in place:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Global Partnership for Social Accountability, a multi-donor trust fund to support CSOs that work in social accountability</li> <li>Seats in committees and WB advisory boards and governing bodies (non-voting seat) for WB trust funds (often donor-specific)</li> <li>Participation at WB Annual meeting</li> <li>Involvements on projects, consultations</li> <li>Development Grant Facility (finance and Partnerships)</li> <li>External Industry Initiative (EII) when WB acts as a trustee and administers money</li> <li>Through country offices – donor meetings and country relations</li> <li>Through projects – relations on the ground</li> </ul> <p>Stakeholders surveyed by MOPAN in 2012 rated the Bank <i>adequate</i> in coordinating with clients in the design of projects, for the clarity of its procedures, flexibility, and responsiveness to changes in the project implementation context. In their written comments, they noted that the Bank's procedures are rigid and that bureaucratic processes often delay implementation.<sup>318</sup></p>	<p>The new strategy proposes that the Bank will focus on customized development solutions and align all its activities with the two goals: work more in partnership with others, including the private sector; and significantly increase collaboration across its agencies.<sup>319</sup></p>
VIII.	<p><i>MO/IO has structures that engage leadership thoroughly with internal/external evaluations</i></p> <p>Independent Evaluation Group's (IEG) strategic goal is to influence the World Bank Group's ability to achieve development outcomes globally and with its partner countries. It reports directly to the Boards of Executive Directors, which oversee IEG's work through the Committee on Development Effectiveness. The IEG conducted a client survey in 2012 to determine whether the Bank was meeting clients' needs and how they perceive its impact. The survey findings are based on identical surveys carried out among three audiences: World Bank Group Board members and advisers, World Bank Group staff, and external stakeholders (academia, private companies, nongovernmental organizations, government, international organizations, donor organizations, and media). The Bank also features the Development Impact Evaluation Initiative (DIME), which seeks to increase the use of impact evaluation (IE) in the design and implementation of bank projects. DIME evaluates programmes based on IE standards, thus entailing an additional internal evaluation of performance.<sup>320</sup></p>	<p>It is good that IEG and the Bank carry out such surveys, but the Bank as a global player has to weigh country priorities with global priorities and naturally they don't match.<sup>321</sup></p>

## j. World Health Organization (WHO)

### Organization

WHO, the directing and coordinating authority for health within the United Nations system, is responsible for providing leadership on global health matters, shaping the health research agenda and setting norms and standards. Headquartered in Geneva, Switzerland, it has six regional offices (Brazzaville, the Republic of Congo; Washington DC, USA; New Delhi, India; Copenhagen, Denmark; Cairo, Egypt; and Manila, Philippines) and 150 country offices.

### Governance

The 194 member countries govern WHO, meeting annually at the World Health Assembly (WHA). The assembly appoints the director-general (DG), supervises the organization's financial policies, and reviews and approves the proposed programme budget. The WHA is advised by the executive board (34 members), who are technically qualified in the health field and are elected for a three-year term.

### Length of leadership mandate

Five years.

### Income

The proposed budget for 2014-2015 is \$3.98 billion.

### Number of staff

8,000, spread over headquarters, regional offices and countries.

### History of leadership

Past director-generals were: B. Chisholm (from Canada, 1948-1953); M.G. Candau (Brazil, 1953-1973); H. Mahler (Denmark, 1973-1988); H. Nakajima (Japan, 1988-1998); G.H. Brundtland (Norway, 1998-2003); Lee Jong-wook (Republic of Korea, 2003-2006 [died in office]) and Anders Nordström (Sweden, 2006-2007 [acting DG, replacing Lee]).

Margaret Chan, the current DG, was appointed on 9 November 2006.

There have been no outward scandals regarding any of the leaders.

### Current trajectory

Under Chan's leadership, WHO has undertaken major financial, managerial and governance-related reform, laying out its projected timeline, intermediate check-in points and guidelines. This reform has been both internal and external-facing, the latter covering WHO's activities with external stakeholders, including countries and non-state entities.

	Indicator	Published rules	Other factors
I.	<p><b>The leadership selection process</b> searches and tests for specific, relevant competencies against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process</p> <p>1 Does the MO/IO publish the criteria/terms of reference for leadership online?</p>	<p>There is no evidence of a “terms of reference” online or in any public record. However, the World Health Organization has a detailed, thorough process of nominating and electing the Director-General, the details of which are on the website, and part of the public records. This process includes the steps necessary for member states to nominate an appropriate candidate, details of the qualifications needed to be a candidate, specific deadlines and interview guidelines.<sup>322</sup></p>	<p>There is a large, ongoing discussion on the election of the Director-General, and it has been high-level agenda item in the 132nd Executive Board meeting in 2013. The current Director-General has been a strong proponent of bringing clarity to the process of selection, and has succeeding in making key changes to ensure greater transparency. The unique aspect of WHO is that all the Regional Directors (RDs) are also elected by the member states of the respective region, as opposed to nominated through other United Nations organizations</p>
2	<p>What percentage of the membership is involved in leadership election and re-election in practice?</p>	<p>The World Health Assembly (composed of all 194 countries) elects the Director-General, on the recommendation of the Executive Board (composed of 34 members).</p>	<p>The membership of the Executive Board is skewed because the weighting given to different regions is not based on population, but rather on the number of member states in that region. There is also considerable variability in the consultative procedures by region. There has been some frustration by Latin America, Africa and South Asia due to a lack of Director-General representing these regions, but it was because most countries not supporting their bids.</p>
3	<p>Is there a time-bound, published, exhaustive process for leadership election that weighs competence against the published criteria?</p>	<p>Yes, the above-mentioned documents list out the exact procedures, including a time-line and other details for leadership selection. It lays out instructions for candidates to provide supporting evidence to match each of the published criteria for the post of the Director-General. There are also set guidelines to submit a curriculum vitae and other institutionalized processes.</p>	<p>There is also an exhaustive document which lays out a code of conduct to promote ethical practices and transparency throughout the nomination/election process.<sup>323</sup></p>
II.	<p><b>The leader has clear performance expectations</b> which are transparent and consistent with MO/IO's overarching goals and which facilitates accountability</p> <p>1 Do the leaders set clear performance expectations for themselves, which are transparent and consistent?</p> <p>2 Is there an expectation that the leader translates overarching goals of organization into a manageable and clear strategy?</p>	<p>The Director General put forth a clear list of personal expectations from her tenure which she shared publicly at the start of her term</p> <p>No available information</p>	



3	Is the leader obliged to disclose conflicts of interest?	No information available publicly	Every staff, P5 and above (including the Director-General) has to declare conflicts of interest annually. This process is conducted by the legal team internally, and is very strict having been updated recently. These declarations are confidential in nature, but the organization is looking into publishing them in the future, based on the United Nations model.
4	Is the leader obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics?	There is a code of conduct and extensive rules and regulations governing WHO staff, <sup>324</sup> however, there is nothing specifically detailed for senior leadership.	
<b>III.</b>			
1	Is the leader subjected to annual performance appraisal?	There is no mention of a formal performance appraisal on the public portal. However, the current Director-General published a self-assessment of her own performance at the culmination of her first term, where all her mandates at the time of her election were compared to her achievements. Although, this appraisal wasn't conducted objectively, it still lays out some performance metrics.	There is a very robust performance programme throughout the organization at every level. MOPAN review has highlighted big changes being undertaken by HR to improve the process; however, there is no formal system of appraisal of the Director-General. She has previously conducted her personal performance appraisal publicly but as it is a self-evaluation, it is not inherently un-biased.
2	Is remuneration or benefits tied to the outcomes of the performance management programme?	A guide for managers in applying WHO performance competencies has been issued. A policy on rewards and recognition will be issued shortly. Furthermore, a guide to help supervisors manage performance is in the final stages of development. <sup>325</sup>	WHO operates at the same pay scale as the rest of the United Nations system, particularly in line with the UNDP. In practice, WHO partially follows a model of remuneration tied to outcomes of the performance management and there are some within-grade pay increases for high performance
3	Is the leader offered coaching and development opportunity to address weaknesses over time?	A global eLearning platform will be launched in September this year. Proposals for the development of a management development programme are currently being evaluated. <sup>326</sup>	The Director-General selected the Global Leadership Committee herself and there is much more focus on leadership skills and management (e-learning, group learning and mentorship programmes). There is a two year programme for senior management including coaching, training and management skills but this is not the case for the Director-General.

IV.	Leadership <b>re-election</b> is based on transparent processes and metrics	
1	<p>Are performance management criteria considered by the full membership in the re-appointment process?</p> <p>The Director-General presented her original priorities and mandate when she was standing up for election for her first term. At the re-appointment for her second term, she presented a document with a self-assessment of how well she performed on those priorities. This was taken into account through the re-nomination process.<sup>327</sup> These were not specifically performance management, but how well the organization, under her leadership, tackled the major challenges.</p>	<p>It was generally lauded that the Director-General started the process of self-evaluation, but this should be expanded to the regional-directors as well. The Director-General wants to create an independent evaluation system for her position at a later stage as well.</p>
2	<p>Are other qualified candidates considered in the re-election process?</p> <p>There is opportunity to stand up against the incumbent Director-General in a re-election process and each candidate is evaluated on the same objective scale as is used for a new election. There have been cases of sitting Regional Directors being challenged by other qualified candidates.</p>	<p>The Director-General was not challenged at the previous re-election process since she had proved herself to be a strong candidate, the opportunity to put forward other candidates existed.</p>
V.	The leader has the authority and mechanisms to <b>shift strategic priorities</b> to meet changing circumstances	
1	<p>Does the leader have the authority to shift strategic priorities in light of external changes?</p> <p>There are some "core functions" that are specified in the organization, that have been set out in the General Programme of Work and that cover a 10 year period (2006–2015).<sup>328</sup> These are relatively un-changeable since this has been decided as long-term 'raison d'être' of the organization. However, the current DG has specified her own priorities stemming from these core functions, and has asked to be evaluated on these specific priorities. "I want my leadership to be judged by the impact of our work on the health of two populations: women and the people of Africa." – Margaret Chan<sup>329</sup> There is also a WHO reform process being undertaken, of which a major component is improved health outcomes, in line with the agreed global health priorities. As a strand in the reform process, WHO is working with its member states to set priorities for its work in order to focus its activities and deliver more effectively.<sup>330</sup> Therefore, it can be said that both the leadership and the member states do have a certain discretion to tailor the core functions into strategic priorities according to current realities and national/international priorities.</p>	<p>There is no authority to change the mandate away from health, for example to topics such as trade or agriculture.</p>
2	<p>Does the MO/IO have processes that facilitate implementation of new strategic priorities?</p> <p>Yes, there is a process to facilitate implementation of new priorities as discussed above. Every DG can prioritize certain specific strategies/diseases or aspects during their tenure, and there is a process during the World Health Assembly where member-states can have input into the strategic priority setting.<sup>331</sup></p>	<p>Extra-Ordinary meetings of the Executive Board have been called in the past for changing strategies.</p>

3	What percentage of resources are set aside for special initiatives decided by and controlled by a subset of the full membership?	76% of WHO's funds are 'voluntary contributions' with most of them being highly specified as to which department or health intervention they should be used for. ( <a href="http://whqlibdoc.who.int/pb/2012-2013/PB_2012%E2%80%932013_eng.pdf">http://whqlibdoc.who.int/pb/2012-2013/PB_2012%E2%80%932013_eng.pdf</a> )	The Director General is trying to ensure a fully-financed budget, through the Financing Dialogue Initiative. Currently, some parts of the budget are over-funded and some are under-funded. According to Ian Smith, Executive Director, Director General's Office, the critical elements to a financed budget is predictability and alignment. It is essential that we know how much money we have, and when we will receive it. Additionally, it is important that the resources are aligned with the organization's work, with the regions, staffing and activities. The WHO is developing a portal which will be transparent, showing all the resources, where they have been spent and to what they have been dedicated to. This is not a unique idea (UNDP has a multi-donor trust fund website as an example), but will be something new for WHO.
VI.	<b>The leader is expected to attract, retain and develop talent through-out the organization</b>		
1	Does the organization take staff surveys to assess staff satisfaction and performance and do leaders utilize the results of these surveys?	Yes, the organization conducts and publishes a "stakeholder survey" which includes both external stakeholders and internal staff. The results are published in a report, available on the website. It seems that from the 2012 survey, one of the key findings was that "21% of external and 25% of internal respondents have doubts regarding WHO's ability to take the necessary measures to ensure the independence of its public health experts, similar proportions voiced concerns about WHO's independence from inappropriate industry influence." The full report with the survey findings is also on the website. ( <a href="http://www.who.int/about/who_perception_survey_2012.pdf">http://www.who.int/about/who_perception_survey_2012.pdf</a> )	There is another survey called the "Perception Survey" that is led by the Department of Communications, led by an external agency. It is shared widely internally and widely discussed by the Assistant Director Generals and the Regional Directors.
2	Is the leader assessed on mentoring and coaching of subordinate staff?	This is part of the performance management system (PMDS) and is taken into account informally.	

VII.	<p><i>MO/IO has structures that encourage management to <b>engage with diverse range of stakeholders</b></i></p>	<p>WHO is fairly conservative in this matter. There is an ongoing process of reform for engaging in non-state actors. The categories of engagement are the following: 1) Governance (where stakeholders can engage in governance matters of WHO), 2) Collaboration (joint work-plan, projects, official relations with NGOs etc.), 3) Consultation (more ad-hoc, due-diligence, conflict of interest, development of standards, sharing of information, expertise and know-how), 4) Finance (non-state actors can make a contribution to WHO), 5) Contracts given to the private sector for carrying out specific pieces of work.</p>
VIII.	<p><i>MO/IO has structures that engage executive management thoroughly with <b>internal/external evaluations</b></i></p>	<p>WHO is committed to a program of regular evaluations, maintaining independence, and engaging in independent evaluations. the Executive Board will conduct and evaluate these for the WHO.</p>





## k. World Trade Organization (WTO)

### Organization

Replacing the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, the WTO is the multilateral forum for negotiating global trade agreements and ensuring that the rules of international trade are correctly applied and enforced.<sup>332</sup>

### Governance

The WTO describes itself as “a rules-based, member-driven organization – all decisions are made by Members, and the rules are the outcome of negotiations among Members”.<sup>333</sup> All 160 member countries may participate in all councils and committees, except the dispute settlement procedures and the committees responsible for plurilateral agreements. While WTO agreement foresees the use of votes when consensus cannot be reached in several specific situations, consensus dominates the decision-making process. Members make decisions related to new rules and their implementation, as well as to organizational matters such as the budget and activities of the secretariat, and on the appointment of the director-general (DG).<sup>334</sup>

The Ministerial Conference, which must meet at least once every two years, is most important. The conference can take decisions on all matters under any of the multilateral trade agreements. The General Council meets regularly in Geneva to carry out WTO functions; it has representatives from all member governments, and has the authority to act on behalf of the ministerial conference. The WTO has three further councils and over 20 committees relevant to the various WTO agreements and the secretariat’s activities; through these groups, members make decisions, monitor progress and carry out the organization’s day-to-day work.

Although not a formal part of the WTO structure, a trade negotiations committee, chaired by the DG, was established by members in the context of the Doha Round of trade negotiations. In the process of negotiations, WTO members, various committee chairs and the DG convene a range of different informal groups and processes, such as “Green Rooms”, which are comprised of various configurations of members with the aim of influencing negotiations and building consensus. This can then facilitate decision-making in the formal WTO committees.

The secretariat is headed by the DG and provides support to WTO members on all of the organization’s activities. As only members make decisions, the secretariat has no decision-making powers with regard to the content, completion

or implementation of WTO agreements. The secretariat does, however, make internal management decisions relevant to implementing the work programme and budget approved by members.

### Length of leadership mandate

Four years; can be renewed once.

### Income

Total budget for 2013 was CHF 197.2 million.

### Number of staff

In the secretariat: 639, from 77 countries (as of March 2013).

### History of leadership

The WTO leadership appointment process is open and competitive, in that any member country can put forward a candidate. An understanding exists among countries that the position should alternate between developed and developing country members.<sup>335</sup>

WTO’s first DG was Peter Sutherland (from Ireland, 1993-1995). Division and deadlock arising from the failure of members to reach consensus on a new DG resulted in the shortened term of Renato Ruggiero (Italy, 1995-1998) and a term-sharing agreement between Mike Moore (New Zealand, 1998/9-2002) and Supachai Panitchpakdi (Thailand, 2002-2005). The subsequent two DGs were Pascal Lamy (France, 2005-2013; reappointed in 2009) and Roberto Azevêdo (Brazil, 2013-present).

In 1994-1995, the United States resisted Ruggiero’s selection on the grounds that the appointment of an Italian would violate an informal understanding that European DGs should not be from one of the large European economies. In the late 1990s, discord among members resulted in a decision to split the term between two DGs – one from a developed and the other from a developing country.

### Current trajectory

Azevêdo’s position as DG started on 1 September 2013. In 2014, he intends to undertake a comprehensive organizational review, including on governance and strategy (but essentially on staffing).

	Indicator	Published rules	Other factors
I.	<b>The leadership selection process</b> searches and tests for specific, relevant competencies against clearly defined criteria through an inclusive, exhaustive process		
1	Does the MO/IO publish the criteria/terms of reference for leadership online?	<p>Terms of reference are not available online. However, the role of the DG is defined in broad terms in WTO legal texts, which are available on the website.<sup>336</sup></p> <p>A 2002 General Council decision in 2002 (document WT/L/509) defines required qualifications for the job.<sup>337</sup></p>	<p>Terms of reference are published with the notice inviting candidatures for DG, i.e. with “Vacancy Notice”; this is posted on-line.<sup>338</sup></p> <p>Interestingly, the Enhanced Integrated Framework (a WTO-related organization for the delivery of technical assistance and capacity building to developing countries) has several publicly available TORs.</p>
2	What percentage of the membership is involved in leadership selection and re-election in practice?	<p>Decisions – including DG selection – are made by <i>consensus</i> of all members. Therefore, all Members can be involved in the leadership appointment and reappointment process.</p>	<p>The degree of involvement by Members varies widely depending on their capacities in terms of human resources and their economic/political significance in the system. Although many informal and formal opportunities exist, the degree of engagement and influence varies. Some groups, such as the African Group, collectively weigh in for particular candidates as the process advances.<sup>339</sup></p>
3	Is there a time-bound, published, exhaustive process for leadership selection that weighs competence against the published criteria?	<p>The “2002 decision” describes in detail the leadership appointment process. It lays out a clear timeframe for a process to commence 9 months before and be completed 3 months before the expiry of an incumbent’s term. Only member countries can nominate candidates, who must be their own nationals, and nominations must be made within one month of the start of the process.</p> <p>There is an agreed description of the required qualifications for the post, with “the desirability of reflecting the diversity of the WTO’s membership in successive appointments to the post” also listed as an explicit factor to be taken into account. Candidates provide CVs, and meet with and make presentations to the WTO General Council. Then in the final two months of the process the Chair of the Council, assisted by the Chair of the Dispute Settlement Body and Chair of the Trade Policy Review Body as Facilitators, consult with members and seeks to build a consensus. There is a provision for the Council to vote if a consensus cannot be reached in the appointed time.<sup>340</sup></p> <p>In the recent appointment process, WTO members officially nominated 9 candidates for the post of the new Director-General from 1 to 31 December 2012. All the candidates made a presentation on their vision for the WTO at a General Council meeting in January 2013. The appointment process concluded with a General Council meeting on 14 May 2013, at which the recommendation to appoint Roberto Azevêdo as the new Director-General was approved.</p>	<p>During the two months of consensus building undertaken by the Chair of the General Council, the transparency and opportunities for participation depend on the specific processes pursued by the Chair. The process and criteria by which Chairs conclude that candidates are removed from the short-list is not always transparent.<sup>341</sup></p>

II. The leader has clear <b>performance expectations</b> which are transparent and consistent with MO/O's overarching goals and which facilitates leadership accountability	
1	<p>Do the leaders set clear performance expectations for themselves, which are transparent and consistent?</p> <p>No official procedure in place. Although the new DG generally delivers a <i>statement</i> to outline his vision and goals, as well as his formal obligations, in front of the General Council, there is no process for setting clear performance expectations or review.</p>
2	<p>Is there an expectation that the leader translates overarching goals of organization into a manageable and clear strategy?</p> <p>Yes. As part of the selection process, all candidates nominated for the position of Director-General make a <i>presentation of their vision</i> for the WTO at a General Council, and again upon their appointment. For example, Roberto Azevêdo gave his vision speech to the General Council on 9 September.<sup>343</sup> This is also done through the annual budget proposal to members.<sup>344</sup></p>
3	<p>Is the leader obliged to disclose conflicts of interest?</p> <p>The disclosure policy only available internally.</p>
4	<p>Is the leader obliged to adhere to a published code of ethics?</p> <p>Yes. However, the code of core ethics is only circulated internally.</p>
III. The leader has a defined <b>performance management</b> programme and receives annual feedback on performance	
1	<p>Is the leadership subjected to annual performance appraisal?</p> <p>Not at the level of DG. Directors, however, are subjected.</p>
2	<p>Is remuneration or benefits tied to the outcomes of the performance management programme?</p> <p>No evidence.</p>

The debates over the role of the DG and the appointees' scope for taking leadership complicate the ability of the leader to set clear expectations of themselves and goals. Many members are reluctant to see the DG take an action or initiative that is not simply the implementation of decisions taken by the Membership. Given debates on the broader mission and purpose of the organization limit the political scope for the Director-General to explicitly lay out a clear agenda for action or change.<sup>342</sup>

The Director-General is expected to report to Member States at the regular General Council meetings on progress and activities of the Secretariat. A further instrument is the elaboration of WTO Annual Report, supervised by the DG, which summarizes the programmes and activities of the organization.<sup>345</sup>

Executive management, like all staff members, are expected to abide by the code of core values. The Staff Rules also require that staff seek authorization for outside activities and disclose any potential financial interests.<sup>346</sup>

The code of core values of the WTO Secretariat exists internally and all staff are required to sign the oath of office upon entry into the organization.<sup>347</sup> The newly appointed DG has signed the Oath of Office. A training manual on WTO core values is available to all staff.

Directors' performances are assessed by the DG or respective DDG through the annual performance evaluation report.<sup>348</sup> The Director-General plans to undertake an objective cascading exercise starting next year.

While there is a Performance Rewards scheme for staff members, this is not applicable to Directors, Deputy Directors General and the DG.<sup>349</sup>



3	Is the leader offered coaching and development opportunities to address weaknesses over time?	Yes, upon request. <sup>350</sup>	Coaching and executive management sessions by external coaches are offered to senior management upon request. Senior Executive Retreats (for DG; DDGs and Directors) have been introduced to discuss openly and collectively the WTO's performance management programme and development feedback. <sup>351</sup>
<b>IV. Leadership re-election is based on transparent processes and metrics</b>			
1	Are performance management criteria considered by the full membership in the re-election process?	No evidence.	
2	Are other qualified candidates considered in the re-election process?	Yes, if new candidates are nominated.	In practice, at the end of the nomination period in 2009, Pascal Lamy was the only candidate and was re-appointed.
<b>V. The leader has the authority and mechanisms to shift strategic priorities to meet changing circumstances</b>			

1	<p>Does the leader have the authority to shift strategic priorities in light of external changes?</p> <p>The organization is member-driven. Hence, it is the members who set the strategic priorities for WTO. Yet the DG can have an indirect impact on Members' consideration of the Organization's strategic priorities. For example, former Director-General, Pascal Lamy, convened a panel on defining the future of trade in April 2012. The panel report "The Future of Trade: The Challenges of Convergence" was released in April 2013.<sup>352</sup> At the start of the 2008 crisis Lamy initiated a monitoring of protectionism, which was subsequently validated by the Members; he also convened an expert group on trade finance to assess needs in the market and inform potential actions to ease access to trade finance.<sup>353</sup></p>	<p>Views on the desirable scope for leadership and independent action by the Director-General vary among Member States and depending on the issue. Given the legally-binding nature of WTO agreements, and their economic significance, most Members resolutely object to the notion that the DG should have any decision-making authority with respect to negotiation, formation or implementation of WTO rules. However, some have argued that the WTO DG 's role should be more clearly specified with regard to the negotiation process – enabling for instance the Director-General to formally propose and push for political solutions to problems or broker deals to bring negotiations to a close. In practice, the DG is involved actively in the process of consensus-building through the process of chairing informal Green Room meetings, ministerial and the trade negotiations Committee. These informal practices meet with varying degrees of satisfaction and approval by Members given the substantive differences among Members on what kinds of agreements and provisions should be pursued, and over the objectives of the organization as a whole.</p> <p>During his tenure as Director-General, Pascal Lamy provided strategic leadership to Members on the importance of Aid for Trade, and advocated to Members the importance of this initiative. The achievement of the launch of this initiative is widely attributed to that Director-General. Similarly, in the face of the most recent economic crisis, the Director-General approved an initiative by the Secretariat to monitor increases in protectionism among Member States. Although the DG did not formally approach the Membership for approval of this action, most Members appear to concur that this was a useful strategic effort on the DG's part.<sup>354</sup></p>
2	<p>Does the MO/IO have processes that facilitate implementation of new strategic priorities?</p>	<p>No evidence.</p>

3	<p>What percentage of resources are set aside for special initiatives decided by and controlled by a subset of the full membership?</p>	<p>No earmarked budget. The WTO derives its income from Members' contributions, which are based on a formula that takes into account each one's share of international trade. Miscellaneous income is minor (contributions from observers and sales).<sup>355</sup></p>	<p>Some Members do provide extra budgetary resources to the WTO Secretariat and to the Enhanced Integrated Framework for capacity building to developing countries, some of which are earmarked for specific training, technical assistance, or Aid for Trade activities in particular countries.<sup>356</sup></p>
<p><b>VI. The leader is expected to <b>attract, retain and develop talent</b> through-out the organization</b></p>			
1	<p>Does the organization take staff surveys to assess staff satisfaction and performance and do leaders utilize the results of these surveys?</p>	<p>Yes, there are regular reports on staff satisfaction.<sup>357</sup></p>	
2	<p>Is the leader assessed on mentoring and coaching of subordinate staff?</p>	<p>No evidence.</p>	
<p><b>VII. MO/IO has structures that encourage leadership to <b>engage with diverse range of stakeholders</b></b></p>			
	<p>The major annual outreach event is the Public Forum, which attracts about 1,000 participants. During press briefings, the Director-General regularly presents remarks. Beyond annual events, such as the public forum and meetings with parliamentarians, the organization does not have formal mechanisms intended to ensure regular interaction with stakeholders from industry, civil society or parliaments. Rather these occur through participation in ad hoc meetings and conferences arranged by the Secretariat or the relevant stakeholders.<sup>358</sup> There are no formal mechanisms for recurring stakeholder consultations with the DG or accreditation for input into the work of the organization or ongoing negotiations. The WTO's regular committees are open only to Member States, although stakeholders can now observe selected parts of dispute settlement proceedings.</p>	<p>The WTO Director-General interacts <i>informally</i> with the heads of many international organizations. The WTO is not a specialized UN agency. However the head of the WTO does participate in the UN Chief Executive Board meeting. The WTO DG participates in the G20 process, but without a clear mandate from Member States. The previous DG approved the Secretariat's pursuit of work with the OECD, the WHO and other international agencies on joint research and monitoring. The WTO also pursues joint activities with organizations such as WIPO on the implementation of technical assistance related to its agreements. Many WTO Committees include IOs among their observers, but there is no specific process for the WTO to engage with heads of other IOs. This normally occurs through bilateral meetings involving the DG or other senior WTO staff.</p>	
<p><b>VIII. MO/IO has structures that engage leadership thoroughly with <b>internal/external evaluations</b></b></p>			
	<p>Detailed expenditures are given in annual report, as well as members' contributions. Interestingly, WTO has an internal audit office. This audit's results are presented to the members and published in the Annual Report.<sup>359</sup></p>	<p>The organization is reviewed by external auditors on finance and human resources matters on a regular basis, whose audit reports are submitted to the Committee of Budget, Finance and Administration for review.<sup>360</sup></p>	

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## Endnotes

1. Jupille, Mattli and Snidal (2013).
2. This occurs in the OECD. Source: email correspondence with an OECD senior official, 17 June 2014.
3. Please send your input to Shubhra Saxena Kabra, World Economic Forum at Shubhra.SaxenaKabra@weforum.org
4. See: [http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf\\_files/EB130/B130\\_ID1-en.pdf](http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB130/B130_ID1-en.pdf).
5. See: [http://www.wto.org/english/thewto\\_e/dg\\_e/dg\\_selection\\_process\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/dg_e/dg_selection_process_e.htm).
6. See: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/70f0e628-4fa2-11e2-a744-00144feab49a.html#axzz2ZxevSMrl>.
7. The terms of appointment were published in a press release on 5 July 2011. See: <http://www.imf.org/external/np/sec/pr/2011/pr11270.htm>.
8. See: <http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/eo.htm>.
9. See: <http://www.imf.org/external/hrd/ombuds.htm>.
10. See: <http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/pages/IEOPreview.aspx?mappingid=y3p1dhO74YQ%3d&img=i6nZpr3iSIU%3d>.
11. See: [http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07\\_01.pdf](http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf).
12. See: [http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07\\_01.pdf](http://www.ieo-imf.org/ieo/files/completedevaluations/05212008BP07_01.pdf).
13. Martinez-Diaz (2009).
14. Unlike the private sector, remuneration and benefits in international organizations are, in most cases, not tied to performance management indicators. Instead, such organizations set fixed salaries for all staff, including their leadership. Those within the UN system – and even some outside it, such as IOM – follow a standardized pay scale. Although benefits may vary, they are generally determined by the cost of living in the respective locations of headquarters (e.g. New York, Geneva, Washington DC) rather than by a leader's performance.
15. For example, Pascal Lamy in 2009. See: [http://www.wto.org/english/news\\_e/news09\\_e/tnc\\_chair\\_report\\_29apr09\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/news09_e/tnc_chair_report_29apr09_e.htm).
16. For example, Donald Kaberuka's statement in 2005. See: <http://www.afdb.org/en/news-and-events/article/statement-at-the-swearing-in-ceremony-by-the-afdb-president-donald-kaberuka-11258/>.
17. Martinez-Diaz (2008), p. 388.
18. Martinez-Diaz (2008) looked at the following: IMF, World Bank, ADB, AfDB, IDB and EBRD.
19. UN (2008). See: [http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/080204\\_Barcelona.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/080204_Barcelona.doc.htm) [accessed 18 September 2014].
20. MOPAN (2012).
21. For instance, Paul Wolfowitz, President, World Bank, resigned in 2007 over an alleged conflict of interest in respect to employment.
22. See: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/CodeofConductforBoardOfficialsDisclosure.pdf>.
23. UN (2013). See: <http://icsc.un.org/resources/pdfs/general/standardsE.pdf> [accessed 6 September 2014].
24. AfDB also has a code of conduct for staff (1999), and one for leaders (2007).
25. UN (2006). See: <http://www.un.org/en/ethics/disclosure.shtml> [accessed 18 September 2014].
26. UN (2008). See: [http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/080204\\_Barcelona.doc.htm](http://www.un.org/News/briefings/docs/2008/080204_Barcelona.doc.htm) [accessed 18 September 2014].
27. The list of 2012 disclosures is available from: [http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure\\_2012.shtml](http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure_2012.shtml).
28. See also: New Zealand State Services Commission (2012). *Leadership Success Profile*. Wellington: State Services Commission.
29. Interview with the senior staff development officer, 26 July 2013.

30. UNHCR has developed an integrated management assessment framework and introduced a performance management system, which includes 360-degree feedback from external stakeholders for all staff. This was in response to staff criticism that promotions were “not based on skills and suitability”, but on “seniority and influence of sponsors” (UK Department for International Development [DFID], *Unpublished Working Paper on UNHCR*: 19). For more on the survey, see: Turk and Eyster (2010).
31. EBRD (2012). Annual report [online]. See: <http://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/annual/ar12ei.pdf>.
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- Admit new members and determine the conditions of their admission
  - Increase or decrease the bank's authorized capital stock
  - Suspend a member
  - Decide appeals from interpretations or applications of this agreement given by the board of directors
  - Authorize the conclusion of general agreements for cooperation with other international organizations
  - Elect the bank's director and president
  - Determine the remuneration of the directors and their alternates, and the salary and other terms of the president's service contract
  - Approve the general balance sheet and the bank's profit-and-loss statement, following review of the auditor's report
  - Determine the reserves and the distribution of the bank's net profits
  - Amend this agreement
  - Decide to terminate the bank's operations and distribute its assets
  - Exercise such other powers as are expressly assigned to the board of governors in this agreement
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- 179 Reinalda, B. 2011. "Secretaries-General of International Organizations and their Career Development: An Analysis of Nine Humanitarian IGOs". In *Paper for the World Conference on Humanitarian Studies, 2-5 June*, at Tufts University, Medford, MA, USA.
- 180 IOM. 2009. *Review of the Organisation Structure of IOM*. Geneva: IOM.
- 181 Interview with senior IOM official, 22 July 2013, and interview with senior IOM officials, 2 September 2013. Swing made performance management and ownership of the organization by member states top priorities. He has put strong emphasis on proper use of the performance appraisal system, which is currently being updated to account for organizational changes of the past five years. The DG has also established good measures to ensure that HR policy responds to the organization's needs; implemented a mandatory rotation process; revamped staff regulations to harmonize conditions of service; taken a zero-tolerance approach to fraud, corruption and unethical behaviour; and taken steps to ensure good gender distribution. (DFID. *Working Paper on IOM*, 17).
- 182 See IOM Constitution. 1989. Article 18 (1).

- 183 The DG is paid at the salary rate of an Assistant Secretary General. Interview with senior IOM official, July 31 2013 and Interview with senior IOM officials, September 2 2013.
- 184 IOM 1989. Constitution, Article 18(2).
- 185 See also IOM Organizational Structure, <http://www.iom.int/cms/about-iom/organizational-chart> accessed 4 August 2014.
- 186 See for example: F. Georgi, 2011. For the Benefit of Some: The International Organization for Migration and its Global Migration Management. In *The Politics of International Migration Management*. M. Geiger and A. Pecoud. Basingstoke and New York, Palgrave Macmillan: 45 - 72.
- 187 DFID, *Multilateral Review 2011. Ensuring Maximum Value for Money for UK aid through multilateral organizations*, March 2011, DFID: London: 1987.
- 188 Interview with senior IOM official, July 31 2013.
- 189 For a listing of IOM's evaluations see: <http://www.iom.int/cms/en/sites/iom/home/about-iom-1/organizational-structure/evaluation/external-evaluations.html>
- 190 The four core areas are detailed in the *UNDP strategic plan, 2008-2011: Accelerating global progress on human development*. The UNDP also manages the UN's "resident coordinator" system to ensure in-country coordination between UN agencies, and publishes an annual report on human development. These are reformulated in the most recent strategic plan, and three areas of work are highlighted: inclusive and effective democratic governance; resilience; and sustainable development pathways. See: UNDP. *Changing with the World – UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014-2017*. New York: UNDP, 20.
- 191 For more on the selection of board members, see: UNDP. *Information note about the Executive Board of UNDP, UNFPA and UNOPs*, [http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/executive\\_board/information\\_noteontheexecutiveboard](http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/executive_board/information_noteontheexecutiveboard) [accessed 19 September 2014].
- 192 UN. 1994. *General Assembly Resolution 48/162, Article 22*. New York: UN.
- 193 The UNDP's expenditure was \$4.53 billion for development activities (provisional for 2012). UNDP. 2013. *UNDP Cumulative Review*. New York: UNDP, 25.
- 194 See: <http://www.undp.ro/undp/human-resources/> [accessed 19 September 2014]; and UNDP. *Changing with the World – UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014-2017*. New York: UNDP, 5.
- 195 MOPAN. 2012. *Assessment of Organisational Effectiveness and Reporting on Development Results: UNDP*, 3.
- 196 UNDP. 2013. *Cumulative Review*. New York: UNDP, 24.
- 197 Ibid.
- 198 Rogers, K. "UNDP cuts HQ staff, creates new lower-level jobs". *Devex*, 3 June 2014. See: <https://www.devex.com/news/undp-cuts-hq-staff-creates-new-lower-level-jobs-83612> [accessed 14 July 2014]; and Santamaria, C. "UNDP to establish crisis response unit". *Devex*, 16 June 2014. See: <https://www.devex.com/news/undp-to-establish-crisis-response-unit-83693> [accessed 14 July 2014].
- 199 The researchers were unable to find these online and no interview participants were aware of one. However, the MOPAN review 2012 UNDP is rated well for 'key documents available to the public' MI 1.3. As 77% of survey respondents rate it as adequate or above in transparency.
- 200 This policy was established in 1958 for UNDP's predecessor – the Special Fund - and continues to apply for the Administrator. See: General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII) Establishment of the Special Fund, 1958, New York. GA Resolution 2029 (XX) Consolidation of the Special Fund and the Expanded Programme of Technical Assistance in a United Nations Development Programme. It was subsequently outlined in UN General Assembly. 2005. 'Appointments to fill vacancies in subsidiary organs and other appointments: confirmation of the appointment of the Administrator of the United Nations Development Programme' Note by the Secretary General, A/59/240, 3 May 2005.
- 201 Interview with former UNDP Administrator, 5 August 2013. Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013.

- 202 Interview with former UNDP Administrator, 5 August 2013. Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013.
- 203 Interview with former UNDP Administrator, 5 August 2013.
- 204 Interview with former senior UNDP staff member, 7 August 2013.
- 205 Martinez-Diaz, Leonardo 2009. "Boards of directors in international organizations: A framework for understanding the dilemmas of institutional design." *Review of International Organizations* 4(4): 403. MOPAN donors at headquarters were asked about the extent to which 'senior management demonstrates leadership on results management. More than 70% rated UNDP as adequate or above on this indicator'. MOPAN, UNDP Report, MOPAN, 2012: 21.
- 206 Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013.
- 207 UNDP. *Changing with the World UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014 - 2017*. UNDP, New York.
- 208 UNDP, 2011, *Budget estimates*: p.11.
- 209 UN. 2006. Secretary General's Bulletin 'Financial Disclosure and Declaration of Interest Statements', ST, SGB/2006/6. 10 April 2006. Available at <http://www.un.org/en/ethics/disclosure.shtml> accessed 1 August 2013.
- 210 The list of 2012 Disclosures is available at [http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure\\_2012.shtml](http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure_2012.shtml) accessed 5 August 2013.
- 211 UN. 2013. *Standards of Conduct for the International Civil Service*. UN: New York. Available at <http://www.undp.org/content/undp/en/home/operations/transparency/overview.html> UNDP also has an Ethics office (established in 2007), which creates UNDP's ethics policy and coordinates with UN ethics committee.
- 212 UN salary and allowance details are available at [http://www.un.org/depts/OHRM/salaries\\_allowances/salary.htm](http://www.un.org/depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salary.htm) accessed 5 August 2013.
- 213 UNDP. 2013. *Cumulative Review*. UNDP: New York: 24.
- 214 Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013; Interview with former UNDP senior staff member, 28 August; Email correspondence with UNDP senior staff member, Feb 27, 2014.
- 215 General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII) Establishment of the Special Fund, 1958, New York, article 21. This Resolution stipulated the conditions for UNDP's predecessor, the Special Fund, which the UNDP inherited. These were: 'The Special Fund shall be administered by a Managing Director under the policy guidance of the Governing Council. The Managing Director shall have the over-all responsibility for the operations of the Fund, with sole authority to recommend to the Governing Council projects submitted by Governments'. For more on the Board's functions see: UN General Assembly. 1994. Resolution 48/162, Article 3. New York: United Nations.
- 216 As stipulated by the Resolution: 'projects shall be undertaken only at the request of a government or group of governments eligible to participate in the Special Fund'. General Assembly Resolution 1240 (XIII) Establishment of the Special Fund, Article 31, 1958, New York. The resolution stipulates other tasks such as: 'the managing director shall establish and maintain close and continuing working relationships with the specialized agencies concerned with those fields of activity in which the Special Fund will operate, and with the International Atomic Agency...'. The Managing director shall be responsible for the evaluation of project requests...and authorized to contract the services off other agencies. The Managing Director shall make appropriate arrangements to follow the execution of projects. The Managing Director shall report to the Governing Council on the status of projects and the financial position of the projects and programmes'.
- 217 Interview with former UNDP Administrator, 5 August 2013. Interview with Craig Murphy, 5 August 2013.
- 218 Interview with former UNDP senior staff member, 7 August 2013.
- 219 The percentage of earmarked contributions were calculated from the UNDP Cumulative Review as follows. Total contributions: 4.64 (regular and other resources) + 1.33 (bilateral earmarked) + 1.53 (multilateral earmarked) + 0.93 (programme contributions) = 8.43 billion; Total earmarked: 1.53 + 1.33 = 1.88 billion and Percentage Earmarked = 1.88/8.43 or 22%. UNDP. 2013. *UNDP Cumulative Review*. UNDP: New York, p.25.
- 220 The UNDP Strategic Review 2014 – 2017 highlights declining core financing as a one of UNDP's top challenges. See: UNDP. 2014. 'Changing the World, UNDP Strategic Review 2014 – 2017', UNDP: 8. For a clear overview of UNDP's

- financing sources see Craig N. Murphy and Stephen Browne. 'UNDP: Reviving a practical Human Development Organization'. *Future United Nations Development System*, Briefing 6, June 2013: 2.
- 221 Craig N. Murphy and Stephen Browne. 'UNDP: Reviving a practical Human Development Organization'. *Future United Nations Development System*, Briefing 6, June 2013: 2.
- 222 UNDP. *Changing with the World UNDP Strategic Plan: 2014 - 2017*. UNDP, New York.
- 223 UNDP. 2011. UNDP Institutional Budget Estimates for 2012 – 2013. Executive Board of the UNDP, UNFPA and the UNOPS: New York: 24 – 27.
- 224 MOPAN. 2012. *Assessment of Organisational Effectiveness and Reporting on Development Results*, UNDP: Xiii.
- 225 As part of a broader humanitarian response, UNHCR is typically the cluster lead for protection, shelter and camp management/camp coordination in IDP situations. UNHCR's total "population of concern" (including refugees and internally displaced persons) is 35.8 million. UNHCR. 2013. *Displacement – The New 21st Century Challenge: UNHCR Global Trends 2012*. Geneva: UNHCR, 3.
- 226 UN General Assembly Resolution 428 (V), 14 December 1950, Annex, UNHCR Statute.
- 227 UNHCR holds annual plenary meetings with ExCom and regular meetings with its standing committee throughout the year. For information on UNHCR, ExCom members and how to apply, see: <http://www.unhcr.org/pages/49c3646c89.html> [accessed 19 September 2014]. With its membership growing rapidly, ExCom has become increasingly unwieldy as a governing committee (interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013).
- 228 UNHCR's ExCom also submits an annual report to the third committee. Although it was created by ECOSCO, it functions like a subsidiary body of the General Assembly. See Betts, A., Loescher, G. and Milner, J. 2012. *UNHCR: The Politics and Practice of Refugee Protection*. Second Edition. Abingdon: Routledge, 108-109.
- 229 UNHCR. 2013. *Global Report 2012*. Geneva: UNHCR.
- 230 Email correspondence with UNHCR, 11 November 2013.
- 231 Turk, V. and Eyster, E. 2010. "Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR". In *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 22:2, 159–172.
- 232 Loescher, G. 2002. *The UNHCR and World Politics: A Perilous Path*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
- 233 *BBC News*. 2005. "Lubbers quits over UN sex claims". 20 February 2005. See: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4282333.stm> [accessed 19 September 2014].
- 234 Goodwin-Gill, G. 1991. "Developments". In *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 3, 120.
- 235 DFID. 2011. *Multilateral Aid Review*. London: DFID, 198.
- 236 UNHCR. 2013. *Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II*, Strategic Review pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153. Geneva: UNHCR.
- 237 *Ibid.* The new Global Service Centre based in Budapest, Hungary has centralized administration and support functions at a reduced cost, compared with having these staffed in Geneva.
- 238 DFID. 2011. *Multilateral Aid Review*. London: DFID, 198. Note that some donors are supportive of UNHCR taking a more expansionist role in humanitarian coordination and natural disasters.
- 239 Email correspondence with the UNHCR executive office, 11 November 2013.
- 240 Main sources: Interview with Jane McAdam, 24 July 2013; Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013 and Email Correspondence, 20 May 2014; Interview with UNHCR Personnel Administration, Payroll and Performance Management, Human Resources (Budapest), 26 July 2013; Interview with UNHCR Senior Staff Development Officer (Budapest), 26 July 2013; Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.



- 241 UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Chapter II, Functions of the High Commissioner, paragraphs 8 – 12.
- 242 UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Chapter III, Organization and Finances, Article 13. The UN Secretary General has a contract with the High Commissioner which outlines his salary and other job details. Telephone interview with Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013. However the HC is elected by the General Assembly and, in principle, should not be subject to authority or direction by the SG. Email correspondence with International Refugee Law Expert, 19 May 2014.
- 243 Email correspondence with UNHCR Executive Office, 11 November 2013. Also note that UNHCR does make much of its policy and other terms of reference available online. They do have a draft of new terms of reference for Assistant High Commissioner (protection) on the website as this was a newly created post (2005).
- 244 For more detail on this see G. Goodwin-Gill. 1991. "United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Election or Appointment?" *International Journal of Refugee Law* (3): 121-4.
- 245 UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Chapter III, Organization and Finances, paragraph 13.
- 246 Betts, Loescher and Milner 2011: 111.
- 247 Betts, Loescher and Milner 2011: 111.
- 248 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August, 2013. The Secretary General on this occasion engaged in extensive consultations with Member states and as no single candidate emerged he submitted two candidates to member states. See: G. Goodwin-Gill. 1991. "United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees: Election or Appointment?" *International Journal of Refugee Law* (3): 121-4.
- 249 NGOs argued that candidates should be interviewed and their biographies and answers were made public. Betts, Loescher and Milner 2011: 111.
- 250 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August, 2013.
- 251 For details on the Global Strategic Priorities see: UNHCR, UNHCR Global Appeal 2014 - 2015, <http://www.unhcr.org/4ec230e916.html>
- 252 Turk, V. and Eyster, E. 2010. 'Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR', *International Journal of Refugee Law*, 22, 2: 170.
- 253 UN. 2006. Secretary General's Bulletin 'Financial Disclosure and Declaration of Interest Statements', ST, SGB/2006/6. 10 April 2006. Available at <http://www.un.org/en/ethics/disclosure.shtml> accessed 1 August 2013.
- 254 The list of 2012 Disclosures is available at [http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure\\_2012.shtml](http://www.un.org/sg/ethicalstandards/PublicDisclosure_2012.shtml) accessed 5 August 2013. UNHCR established an independent Ethics Office in 2008 which reports directly to the HC. Its functions are to: provide confidential advice to staff and senior management on ethical issues (e.g. conflicts of interest; gifts; use of UN assets); promote a culture of integrity and accountability; raise awareness and develop standards and education of ethics issues; administer the financial disclosure programme; implement the policy on the protection of staff from retaliation. Executive Office of the United Nations High Commissioner's Programme, Standing Committee. 2009. Report on the Ethics Office, EC/60/CRP.21, 24 August 2009.
- 255 UNHCR, 2004. *Code of Conduct*, 1.
- 256 Email correspondence with UNHCR, 11 November 2013.
- 257 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013. The Global Trends Report details the numbers of 'persons of concern' including refugees, IDPs, stateless and other displaced peoples. Note that evaluating UNHCR and the High Commissioner's performance solely on these numbers is problematic as they are affected by factors beyond UNHCR's control.
- 258 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.
- 259 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.
- 260 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013. Note that UNHCR develops its own independent guidelines based on these. Interview with UNHCR Human Resources Official, Budapest, 26 July 2013.

- 261 UN salary and allowance details are available at [http://www.un.org/depts/OHRM/salaries\\_allowances/salary.htm](http://www.un.org/depts/OHRM/salaries_allowances/salary.htm) accessed 5 August 2013.
- 262 Telephone Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.
- 263 Through the GLC, UNHCR hopes to ‘measure more systematically the impact of learning on staff to ensure that approaches used add real value’ and are adjusted to remain relevant (Turk and Eyster, 2010: 171). UNHCR have a Senior Staff Development Officer, Head, Management, Leadership & Communications based in Budapest. They develop and convene a leadership programme for senior staff (such as heads of missions). The role of the Senior Staff Development Officer is to ‘support the work of the management/leadership and external relations Unit, with a primary responsibility for the conceptualization, design, development and delivery of management and leadership related learning programmes for various levels of management. S/he is accountable for pro-actively supporting the learning culture in UNHCR by aligning effective learning with institutional goals’. See UNHCR, Job Description, Senior Staff Development Officer (Management and Leadership), 2012 available online. They provide training up D1 level Interview with Senior Staff Development Officer, 26 July 2013.
- 264 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013.
- 265 Telephone Interview with UNHCR 30 July 2013.
- 266 The High Commissioner’s functions are outlined in the UNHCR Statute, Chapter II, paragraphs 6 – 12. The Statute also states that ‘The High Commissioner shall be entitled to present his views before the General Assembly, the Economic and Social Council and their subsidiary bodies’ and that he ‘shall report annually to the General Assembly through the Economic and Social Council...’ UNHCR. 1950. UNHCR Statute. Paragraph 11.
- 267 Interview with Guy Goodwin-Gill, 2 August 2013.
- 268 These shifts are captured in: UNHCR. 2013. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II, Strategic Review pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153. UNHCR: Geneva.
- 269 Email correspondence with UNHCR Executive Office, 11 November 2013.
- 270 Interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.
- 271 UNHCR. 2013. Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees, Part II, Strategic Review pursuant to General Assembly Resolution 58/153. UNHCR: Geneva.
- 272 UNHCR established a committee to develop action plans and carry-out survey recommendations in 2011. Interview with Senior Staff Development Officer, 26 July 2013.
- 273 Turk, V. and Eyster, E. 2010. ‘Strengthening Accountability in UNHCR’, *International Journal of Refugee Law*, Vol. 22, 2: 159 – 172.
- Staff surveys, according to DFID’s working paper, found that staff are dissatisfied with promotions and postings as it is felt that promotions are ‘not based on skills and suitability’ but ‘seniority and influence of sponsors’ (DFID, Unpublished Working Paper on UNHCR: 19). To increase staff confidence in the transparency and fairness of recruitment and promotion UNHCR has developed an integrated management assessment framework and introduced a performance management system, which includes 360 degree feedback from external stakeholders for all staff. (DFID, Unpublished Working Paper on UNHCR: 19). This suggests senior management are responding to staff surveys.
- 274 Telephone interview with UNHCR Chef du Cabinet (Geneva), 30 July 2013.
- 275 IBRD articles of agreement; see: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BO DEXT/0,,contentMDK:20049557~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036~isCURL:Y,00.html>.
- 276 IDA articles of agreement and by-laws; see: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/ORGANIZATION/BODEXT/0,,contentMDK:21353441~pagePK:64020054~piPK:64020408~theSitePK:278036~isCURL:Y,00.html>.
- 277 IFC articles of agreement; see: [http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/CORP\\_EXT\\_Content/IFC\\_External\\_Corporate\\_Site/About+IFC/Articles+of+Agreement/](http://www.ifc.org/wps/wcm/connect/CORP_EXT_Content/IFC_External_Corporate_Site/About+IFC/Articles+of+Agreement/).
- 278 MIGA convention; see: [http://www.miga.org/documents/miga\\_convention\\_november\\_2010.pdf](http://www.miga.org/documents/miga_convention_november_2010.pdf).

- 279 ICSID convention; see: <https://icsid.worldbank.org/ICSID/ICSID/RulesMain.jsp>.
- 280 WB organization chart; see: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTABOUTUS/Resources/bank.pdf>.
- 281 World Bank projects and operations; see: <http://www.worldbank.org/projects>.
- 282 World Bank. *Annual Report 2013*; see: <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/16091/9780821399378.pdf?sequence=1>, p. 6.
- 283 Thorton, P. "World Bank Revamp". *Guardian*, 18 November 2013. See: <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/poverty-matters/2013/nov/08/world-bank-job-cuts-jim-yong-kim>.
- 284 World Bank. *Annual Report 2012*; see [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2012/Resources/8784408-1346247445238/AnnualReport2012\\_En.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2012/Resources/8784408-1346247445238/AnnualReport2012_En.pdf).
- 285 Kahler, M. 2001. *Leadership Selection in Major Multilaterals*. Washington DC: Institute for International Economics.
- 286 Rushe, D. "World Bank candidate Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala says job will go to Jim Yong Kim". *Guardian*, 16 April 2012. See: <http://www.theguardian.com/business/2012/apr/16/world-bank-president-jim-kim>.
- 287 Lowrey, A. "World Bank, Rooted in Bureaucracy, Proposes a Sweeping Reorganization". *The New York Times*, 6 October 2013. See: [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/international/world-bank-rooted-in-bureaucracy-proposes-a-sweeping-reorganization.html?\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/international/world-bank-rooted-in-bureaucracy-proposes-a-sweeping-reorganization.html?_r=0).
- 288 Harding, R. "World Bank: Man on a mission". *Financial Times*, 7 April 2014. See: <http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/012f15d6-b8fa-11e3-98c5-00144feabdc0.html#axzz31WQwF8z4>.
- 289 World Bank Archives. "Robert Strange McNamara". See: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:20502974~pagePK:36726~piPK:437378~theSitePK:29506,00.html>.
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- 291 Humphrey, C. and Michaelowa, K. "Shopping for Development: Multilateral Lending, Shareholder Composition and Borrower Preferences". In *World Development*, Vol. 33, April 2013, pp. 142-155.
- 292 Farnsworth, E. "The BRICS Try to Bank". *U.S. News & World Report*, 18 July 2014. See: <http://www.usnews.com/opinion/blogs/world-report/2014/07/18/brics-development-bank-could-challenge-world-bank-and-imf>.
- 293 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/PresContConfCopy.pdf>
- 294 Steven Weisman. "Wolfowitz Resigns, Ending Long Fight at World Bank." *The New York Times* (May 18th, 2007): <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/washington/18wolfowitz.html?pagewanted=all>
- 295 Kahler, Miles. *Leadership Selection in Major Multilaterals*. Institute for International Economics; Washington, DC 2001
- 296 Interview with a former official, June 2013, Oxford
- 297 Minutes of the WBG Board meetings <http://web.worldbank.org/external/projects/main?pagePK=64256109&piPK=64818889&theSitePK=40941&menuPK=51146024>
- 298 Interview with a current official, October 2013, Washington, DC
- 299 World Bank Archives. The Presidency of Robert McNamara: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTABOUTUS/EXTARCHIVES/0,,contentMDK:20502974~pagePK:36726~piPK:437378~theSitePK:29506,00.html>;
- 300 WBG Strategy for 2030 approved in April 2013 <http://www.worldbank.org/content/dam/Worldbank/document/WB-goals2013.pdf>
- 301 Interview with a former official, June 2013, Oxford
- 302 <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/BODINT/Resources/CodeofConductforBoardOfficialsDisclosure.pdf>

- 303 See Steven R. Weisman, 'Wolfowitz Resigns, Ending Long Fight at World Bank' New York Times, May 18, 2007, [http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/washington/18wolfowitz.html?pagewanted=all&\\_r=0](http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/18/washington/18wolfowitz.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0)
- 304 [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTETHICS/Resources/ethics\\_code\\_2013-Mar13-CRA.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/INTETHICS/Resources/ethics_code_2013-Mar13-CRA.pdf).
- 305 IEG evaluation of the World Bank's organizational effectiveness [http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/matrix\\_eval.pdf](http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/matrix_eval.pdf)
- 306 Interview with a former official, June 2013, Oxford
- 307 WBG Annual Report 2012 [http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2012/Resources/8784408-1346247445238/AnnualReport2012\\_En.pdf](http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EXTANNREP2012/Resources/8784408-1346247445238/AnnualReport2012_En.pdf)
- 308 Harding, "World Bank: Man on a mission," *Financial Times*.
- 309 Interview with a current official, October 2013, Washington, DC
- 310 See Note xii.
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- 312 Interview with a former official, July 2014
- 313 IEG evaluation of trust funds (2011): [http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/tf\\_eval.pdf](http://ieg.worldbankgroup.org/Data/reports/tf_eval.pdf)
- 314 Interview with a current official, October 2013, Washington, DC
- 315 [http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/international/world-bank-rooted-in-bureaucracy-proposes-a-sweeping-reorganization.html?\\_r=4&](http://www.nytimes.com/2013/10/07/business/international/world-bank-rooted-in-bureaucracy-proposes-a-sweeping-reorganization.html?_r=4&)
- 316 Interview with a current official, October 2013, Washington, DC
- 317 Interview with a former official, June 2013, Oxford
- 318 MOPAN Annual Report 2012 on the World Bank [http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN\\_2012\\_WB\\_Final\\_Vol\\_1\\_Issued\\_December\\_2012\\_1.pdf](http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_2012_WB_Final_Vol_1_Issued_December_2012_1.pdf) [http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN\\_2012\\_WB\\_Final\\_Vol\\_2\\_Issued\\_December\\_2012.pdf](http://www.mopanonline.org/upload/documents/MOPAN_2012_WB_Final_Vol_2_Issued_December_2012.pdf).
- 319 World Bank Group Strategy, attached for the October 12, 2013 meeting of the Development Committee: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/DEVCOMMEXT/0,,pagePK:64000837~piPK:64001152~theSitePK:277473~contentMDK:23470472,00.html>.
- 320 World Bank. DIME: <http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/EXTDEC/EXTDEVIMPEVAINI/0,,contentMDK:23422972~pagePK:64168445~piPK:64168309~theSitePK:3998212,00.html>
- 321 Interview with a former official, July 2014
- 322 [http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf\\_files/EB130/B130\\_ID1-en.pdf](http://apps.who.int/gb/ebwha/pdf_files/EB130/B130_ID1-en.pdf)  
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